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This dissertation presents two studies on credit risk in emerging markets.  
In Chapter 1, I examine how the credit risks of corporations in nine emerging 
markets (EMs) affect those of their sovereigns. I construct a novel data set that 
combines daily corporate news and daily credit default swap (CDS) rates on EMs’ 
sovereign and corporate bonds. A high-frequency event-study analysis shows that a 
10% surprise increase in corporate CDS rates leads to about a 3.0% rise in sovereign 
CDS rates within a one-day event window. Being an SOE adds another 3.5% rise in 
sovereign CDS rates. Being a corporation operating in a government-dependent sector 
adds a 3.0% rise in sovereign CDS rates. Being a large corporation adds a 2.6% to 3.8% 
rise in sovereign CDS rates. Stress in domestic banking sectors also contributes to 
additional spillovers. Among all channels, being an SOE has the most prominent effect. 
An extreme value analysis shows that extreme changes in sovereign CDS are more 
likely when CDS rates of its SOEs, government-dependent, or large corporations 
  
experience extreme changes, even after controlling for common shocks that affect both 
corporations and sovereigns.  
In Chapter 2, I study the drivers of sovereign credit default swap (CDS) rates in 
a group of seventeen emerging markets over July 2004-December 2017, covering the 
2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. I find that a single principal component accounts 
for 34, 60, 48 percent of the variation in sovereign CDS rates in the pre-crisis, crisis, 
and post-crisis period, respectively. Moreover, panel estimates show that: first, local 
factors, including stock market returns and exchange rates against the U.S. dollar, are 
always critical determinants of EMs’ sovereign CDS rates; second, stepping into the 
crisis period, U.S. stock market return and bond market volatility start to affect EMs’ 
sovereign CDS rates significantly; third, after the crisis ends, U.S. stock market return 
continues its influence, but a broader set of global factors become to play an essential 
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1 Chapter 1: Corporate-to-Sovereign Credit Risk Spillovers: 
Evidence from Emerging Markets 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Sovereign credit risk has always been a concern for emerging markets (EMs). There 
have been 17 sovereign defaults by 12 EMs since 1999.[1] Although researchers have 
documented that sovereign credit risk impacts the real sector of the economy, few have 
studied whether credit risk in the real sector could be a source of sovereign credit risk. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements, total credit lent to non-financial 
corporations as a percentage of GDP in EMs substantially increased from 2007 to 2016. 
The aggregate EM corporate debt-to-GDP ratio has grown by 46 percentage points in 
that period, compared to 4.9 percentage points in advanced economies. Aggregate EM 
corporate debt reached 106 percent of their GDP by 2016. Table 1.1 lists some selected 
EMs’ sovereign credit rating actions related to corporate sector conditions, taken 
recently by Moody’s, one of the major credit rating agencies. The rationale behind these 
rating actions indicates several possible channels through which corporate credit risk 
could spill over to the corresponding sovereign credit risk. 
 





Table 1.1: Selected EMs’ Sovereign Credit Rating Actions by Moody’s (2011-2016) 
Date Country Rating Action Rationale Related to Corporate Sector 
11/20/2013 Malaysia 
Moody’s changes outlook 
for Malaysia’s A3 rating 
to positive from stable. 
We expect limited volatility from these items, including dividends, royalty payments, 




bond rating to Baa3; on 
review for further 
downgrade. 
Review for future downgrade will examine the extent to which the potential need to 
provide financial support of the corporate and banking sectors may erode the 
sovereign’s financial strength...and/or increase the use of government guarantees. 
8/11/2015 Brazil 
Moody’s downgrades 
Brazil’s rating to Baa3 
from Baa2; outlook 
changed to stable. 
Low capacity utilization, low business confidence, and Petrobras-related 
developments will negatively affect investment prospects this year and next. Political 
dynamics are damaging: the lack of political consensus on fiscal reforms have been 
exacerbated by the events surrounding the Lava Jato investigation and Petrobras-
related corruption scandals. 
2/24/2016 Brazil 
Moody’s downgrades 
Brazil’s issuer and bond 
ratings to Ba2 with a 
negative outlook. 
The downgrade to Ba2 is intended to capture that ongoing deterioration, while the 
negative outlook contemplates the risks of further deterioration to Brazil’s credit 
profile emanating from macroeconomic shocks...or the need to support government-
related entities. Reduced uncertainty about the magnitude of contingent liabilities 
migrating to the sovereign balance sheet, most likely from Petrobras, could also lead 
Moody’s to stabilize the outlook. 
3/2/2016 China 
Moody’s changes outlook 
on China’s Aa3 
government bond rating 
to negative from stable; 
affirms Aa3 rating. 
The government’s balance sheet is exposed to contingent liabilities through regional 
and local governments, policy banks, and SOEs. The ongoing increase in leverage 
across the economy and financial system and the stress in the SOE sector imply a 
rising probability that some of the contingent liabilities will crystallize on the 
government’s balance sheet. 
3/31/2016 Mexico 
Moody’s changes 
Mexico’s outlook to 
negative from stable; 
affirms A3 rating. 
One key driver of today’s rating action is contingent liabilities in the form of possible 
government support to PEMEX, given liquidity pressures at the state-owned oil 





The first possible channel is that a deterioration in state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) or government-dependent sectors has the potential to trigger the use of 
government guarantees and thus become a driver of sovereign credit downgrading.[2] 
When SOEs or government-dependent companies have difficulty paying back debt and 
the sovereign assumes the contingent liabilities of SOEs, the costs of the bailout hurt 
the government’s fiscal position and increase its sovereign credit risk.[3] The number 
of contingent liabilities that may crystallize on governments’ balance sheets could be 
sizable. According to IMF (2015), the share of EMs’ corporate debt issued by SOEs 
increased from nearly zero in 2010 Q1 to more than 40 percent in 2015 Q3.  
The second possible channel is that certain corporations are so large that their 
failure would be a disaster to their government (for example, by causing a substantial 
decline in tax revenue) or aggregate economic activity. Therefore, government support 
is needed in times of difficulty, i.e., these firms are “too big to fail.” It is also possible 
that large corporations are systemically important and may have more spillovers to the 
sovereign, which does not necessarily depend on implicit bailout guarantees for these 
corporations. Credit risk to systemically important corporations could spill over to the 
sovereign simply because adverse shocks to large corporations hurt the overall 
economy and tax revenue. 
The third possible channel is through the banking sector. Greater corporate 
leverage in EMs can make firms less able to withstand adverse shocks to income or 
 
[2] I later measure the government dependence of different sectors by using the method of Pellegrino and 
Zingales (2017), who capture the degree of government involvement in an industry's media coverage. 
[3] SOEs are usually more politically connected than non-SOEs, and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 
(2006) document that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out in a crisis 





asset values. An increased possibility of corporate default could quickly spill over to 
the banking sector because corporate debt accounts for a significant share of emerging 
market banks’ assets (IMF, 2015). Elevated losses in the banking sector may, in turn, 
weaken the sovereign’s financial strength and induce government bailouts of banks, 
whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. 
In this study, I undertake a systematic examination of corporate credit risk’s 
impact on sovereign credit risk through these three transmission channels. I analyze a 
set of 9 EMs: Brazil, Chile, China, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, South 
Africa, and Thailand. This group of countries is particularly interesting because the 
mechanisms studied in this paper may already be at work in these countries. Most of 
them have large quasi-sovereign companies that are not only highly indebted, as shown 
in Figure 1.1, but are also among the most significant contributors to the GDP growth 
of their home country. As energy prices turned unfavorable in recent years, these 
companies found it hard to pay back debt with decreased profits, and the probability of 
government bailouts and banking sector failures rose. 
To measure corporate and sovereign credit risk, I use daily credit default swap 
(CDS) rates, a market-based risk-neutral measure of the probability of default.[4] The 
higher the CDS rate, the greater the market’s perceived probability of default. A CDS 
 
[4] A CDS is a financial derivative in which the seller of the swap agrees to insure the buyer against the 
possibility that the issuer (sovereign or firm) defaults on its debt. Once a third party, the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), declares a credit event, an auction occurs to determine the 
price of the defaulted debt. The CDS seller then pays the buyer the difference between the face and the 
auction value of the debt. An important advantage of using CDS data (rather than bond data) is that the 
CDS market is typically more liquid than the corresponding bond market, resulting in more accurate 





rate of 300 basis points, for example, implies it would cost $300,000 per year to insure 
$10 million worth of debt over a particular time frame, typically five years. 
Figure 1.1: Selected Quasi-Sovereign Company’s Debt as Percentage of GDP  
Year 2016 
 
Source: Worldscope and IMF. 
There is a critical identification issue in estimating the impact of changes in 
corporate CDS rates on changes in sovereign CDS rates, and this paper aims to mitigate 
the issue. A positive correlation between corporate and sovereign CDS rates may 
simply demonstrate the substantial pass-through running from sovereign to corporate 
credit risk, which has been well documented in the literature (as discussed in Section 
1.2). To show empirically that the direction of causality is indeed from corporate to 
sovereign risk, I use a high-frequency event-study analysis as in Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Swanson (2005) to confirm the presence of causality running from corporate to 
sovereign credit risk. Section 1.4 also uses an extreme value analysis as in Forbes 





 For the high-frequency event-study analysis, I construct a new data set that 
captures changes in sovereign credit risk in a 24-hour window containing news releases 
relevant to that country’s corporations’ credit status, using daily data from 1/1/2014 to 
12/29/2016. The use of intra-day data allows better isolation of the response of 
sovereign risk to news on corporate risk. The results show that a 10% increase in 
corporate CDS rates leads to about a 3.0% rise in sovereign CDS rates within a one-
day event window. Being an SOE adds another 3.5% rise in sovereign CDS rates. Being 
a corporation operating in a government-dependent sector adds a further 3.0% rise in 
sovereign CDS rates.  Being a large corporation adds another 2.6% to 3.8% rise in 
sovereign CDS rates. These estimates are statistically significant. Stress in the domestic 
banking sector, measured by elevated bank CDS rates and banking sector news 
releases, also contributes to credit risk spillovers. The results of the regression with all 
channels included show that being an SOE has the most prominent effect among all 
channels. 
Additionally, I use an extreme value analysis to assess the contagion effects. I 
identify the days during the sample period when either the corporation or sovereign has 
an extreme-positive or extreme-negative change in CDS rates, defined as a change in 
the top or bottom 5 or 1 percentile of the distribution of changes in CDS rates. Extreme 
changes in corporate CDS rates are significantly and positively correlated with the 
probability of an extreme change in its sovereign CDS rate on the same day. That 
probability is increased by a factor of up to 16.7 compared to the case of no extreme 
changes in the corporate CDS rate. Being an SOE or a large corporation contributes to 





able to identify the direction of causality, it still can shed light on the extent of 
contagion between corporate and sovereign CDS rates. 
The paper has several policy implications. First, because the sovereign-SOE 
nexus can spread the SOEs’ corporate risk to the sovereign and have a systemic impact, 
policymakers should closely monitor SOEs’ financial status, especially highly 
leveraged SOEs in strategically important sectors. Second, SOEs may overborrow from 
the perspective of the social planner. There is evidence that higher sovereign credit risk 
passes down to more expensive financing for other firms in that country (see Section 
1.2). Therefore, there is a pecuniary externality associated with SOE borrowing. When 
SOEs make borrowing decisions, they do not consider how their actions could affect 
other firms’ financing costs through higher sovereign credit risk. The real borrowing 
cost for SOEs should include their spillover effect on other firms. Moreover, large 
SOEs with close government relationships are usually able to get subsidized credit from 
state-owned banks. They know that governments are likely to bail them out if they 
default, creating a moral hazard problem. All of these factors contribute to SOEs’ 
overborrowing, and policymakers may want to privatize SOEs to improve social 
welfare. Similarly, policymakers should also review regulations on large and 
interconnected corporations that are “too big to fail.” They should work to mitigate the 
moral hazard problem, e.g., by preventing them from deliberately taking positions that 
are high-risk, high-return and from leveraging such risks based on implicit guarantees. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a 





frequency event study. Section 1.4 reports and discusses the main findings of the 
extreme value analysis. Section 1.5 concludes. 
1.2 Related Literature 
This research is related to several strands of the literature. Many studies have 
documented a strong link between sovereign and private sector interest rates, both in 
emerging economies and, more recently, in European countries. Government crises 
affect aggregate outcomes through firms’ borrowing, creating a financial channel; see 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) for discussion of sovereign crises 
and business cycles in emerging markets, and Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Müller 
(2013) for discussion of the implications of sovereign risk pass-through for fiscal 
multipliers. The pass-through of sovereign risk to the private sector has been studied 
both theoretically and empirically. Bocola (2016) proposes a quantitative model for 
studying the transmission of sovereign risk to the borrowing costs of firms and real 
economic activity through financial intermediation. Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 
(2014) model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk, in which government 
bailouts of the financial sector increase sovereign credit risk, which in turn weakens 
the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond 
holdings. Arellano, Bai, and Bocola (2019) use a sovereign debt model calibrated to 
Italian firm- and bank-level data to measure the effects of an increase in sovereign risk 
on the private sector. They find that heightened sovereign risk was responsible for one-
third of the observed output decline during the 2011-2012 crisis in Italy. 
 On the empirical side, Baskaya and Kalemli-Özcan (2016) investigate the effect 





exogenous shock to Turkey’s sovereign default risk. Bedendo and Colla (2015) 
document that an increase in sovereign credit spreads in the euro area is associated with 
a significant increase in corporate spreads, and hence firms’ borrowing costs. Augustin, 
Boustanifar, Breckenfelder, and Schnitzler (2018) explore the first Greek bailout to 
examine the transmission of sovereign risk to corporate credit risk.  
The existing literature on sovereign-corporate linkages focuses on causality 
running from sovereign to corporate risk, while my paper explores causality running in 
the other direction. Combining these two sides implies a loop between sovereign and 
corporate credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk weakens the financial sector and 
increases the borrowing costs of firms. A distressed corporate sector induces 
government bailouts, whose costs, in turn, increase sovereign credit risk. 
 This paper contributes to the understanding of the determinants of sovereign 
credit risk. Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) find that 64 percent of 
sovereign credit risk can be linked to global factors, using a dataset of sovereign CDS 
contracts of 26 countries. Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013) show that fiscal 
space and other macroeconomic factors are statistically and economically significant 
determinants of sovereign risk for the Eurozone Periphery countries. Dieckmann and 
Plank (2012) document that the state of a country’s financial system and also the state 
of the world financial system have strong explanatory power for the behavior of 
sovereign CDS spreads. Du and Schreger (2017) show that a higher reliance on external 
foreign currency corporate financing is associated with a higher default risk on 





show that corporate credit risk is also a determinant of sovereign credit risk using a 
high-frequency event-study analysis.  
 This paper also adds to the emerging literature on how microeconomic shocks 
may transmit to fluctuations at the macro level. This literature characterizes the law of 
motion for the firm size distribution for any finite number of firms, so it does not rely 
on the traditional “continuum of firms” assumption. Gabaix (2011)’s seminal work 
introduces the “Granular Hypothesis,” which states that whenever the firm size 
distribution is fat-tailed (compared to a normal distribution), idiosyncratic shocks 
average out at a slow enough rate that they can translate into aggregate fluctuations. 
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2017) argue that macroeconomic tail risks 
can have their origins in idiosyncratic microeconomic shocks to disaggregated sectors. 
Carvalho and Grassi (2019) show that the prominence of a small number of firms leaves 
open the possibility that aggregate outcomes may be affected by the dynamics of large 
firms. They develop a quantitative theory of aggregate fluctuations caused by firm-
level disturbances alone. Kwak (2019) shows that rising leverage in large European 
firms can explain about a third of rising sovereign spreads during the 2020-2012 
European debt crisis. My paper complements this literature by focusing on the 
transmission of credit risk from the micro to the macro level for large firms in emerging 
markets. 
 Finally, this paper is related to the literature on the impact of SOEs and the real 
cost of government bailouts. Lin, Cai, and Li (1998) argues that an economy with SOEs 
is subject to allocative inefficiency because the industrial structure deviates from the 





analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of 450 politically connected firms from 
35 countries and find that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to 
be bailed out than similar non-connected firms. Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011) 
evaluate the macroeconomic and distributional effects of government bailout 
guarantees in the US mortgage market and find that eliminating such a guarantee could 
substantially increase aggregate welfare. This paper establishes another source of 
inefficiency resulting from SOEs and government-dependent firms, namely their 
excessive borrowing and consequently higher borrowing costs for other firms due to 
elevated sovereign credit risk. 
1.3 High-frequency Event-study Analysis: The Effects of Changes in Corporate 
Risk on Sovereign Risk 
In this section, I investigate the spillover effects of changes in corporate risk on 
sovereign risk using a high-frequency event-study analysis and explore the channels of 
these spillovers. I construct a new data set that captures changes in sovereign credit risk 
in a one-day window bracketing news releases relevant to its corporations’ credit status 
from 1/1/2014 to 12/29/2016. The use of daily data allows me to isolate better the 
response of sovereign risk to news releases on corporate risk. I identify idiosyncratic 
corporate shocks that are exogenous with respect to sovereign risks. According to the 
estimates, news on corporate risk has a significant impact on sovereign risk, as 
measured by changes in rates in the CDS market. Moreover, changes in credit risk of 
SOEs, corporations in government-dependent sectors, and corporations with a large 
scale in terms of total assets, total liabilities, or corporate income tax payment have an 






I examine how sovereign CDS rates respond to changes in corporate CDS rates within 
a one-day window after corporate news releases, using the following regression: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
+ 𝜃𝜃∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Equation 1 
where i, j, and t denote corporate, sovereign, and time on a daily basis, respectively. 
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) denotes the daily log change in the corporate CDS rates 
on the date of the news release, and ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) denotes the daily log change 
in the sovereign CDS rates for the country where the corporation’s headquarters 
resides. ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) is the daily log change in a list of country-level control variables, 
which may drive corporate and sovereign credit risk at the same time. It includes (1) 
the daily log change in the close price of that sovereign’s major stock index; (2) the 
daily log change in the relevant commodity price associated with each corporation; and 
(3) the daily log change in that country’s exchange rate against the US dollar.[5] [6]  
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗  and 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗  denote country and day fixed effects, respectively. The day fixed 
effects help to capture changes in macroeconomic fundamentals that have a common 
effect on both corporate and sovereign credit risk. 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is a stochastic error term that 
captures the effects of other factors that influence the sovereign CDS rates. 
 
[5] The stock indices adopted for each country are the Ibovespa Brasil Sao Paulo Stock Exchange Index 
for Brazil; Santiago Stock Exchange General Index for Chile; Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
Index for China; FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index for Malaysia; Índice de Precios 
y Cotizaciones (IPC) for Mexico; Philippines Stock Exchange PSEi Index for the Philippines; Moscow 
Exchange MICEX-RTS PJSC for Russia; FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index for South Africa; and Stock 
Exchange of Thailand SET Index for Thailand. 
[6] Gazprom is associated with natural gas; Codelco with copper; CAP, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, 
Gerdau, Severstal, and Usiminas with steel; ALROSA with diamonds; AngloGold Ashanti with gold; 





 I use a high-frequency event-study analysis to estimate Equation 1. One 
generally cannot estimate such a model using monthly or quarterly data due to 
simultaneous equations and omitted variables bias. In particular, the change in 
corporate CDS rates could be a response to a change in sovereign risk that took place 
earlier in the month or quarter, due to the direct effects of sovereign risk on corporate 
borrowing costs. Alternatively, both corporate and sovereign risk could be responding 
to crucial macroeconomic news (captured by 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) that was released earlier in the 
period, such as US monetary policy shocks. In either case, the classical regression 
assumption that 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is orthogonal to ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 would be violated.  
 These problems can be mitigated by using higher-frequency data to focus on 
the correlation between sovereign and corporate CDS rates during periods around the 
release of corporate news. I estimate Equation 1 using only daily changes that happen 
within a narrow window of time after the news releases. By setting the event-study 
window to 24 hours, it becomes less likely that any other significant events took place 
within this narrow window that might have influenced both sovereign and corporate 
risk, thereby reducing omitted variables and simultaneity bias. A similar methodology 
has been widely used in finance, for example, in the study of the post-earnings-
announcement drift phenomenon, which is the impact of firms’ earnings 
announcements on their stock returns over the next 30 or 60 trading days.[7]  
 





1.3.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
The focus of my study is the impact of corporate credit risk on sovereign risk in 
emerging markets. To measure credit risk, I collect publicly-traded CDS data from the 
Markit database. Compared to other sources of CDS data such as Bloomberg and 
Thomas Reuters Datastream, Markit has several advantages. First, it has the most 
comprehensive coverage, providing end-of-day (i.e., 4pm EDT) CDS single name 
composites on approximately 2,600 entities. On a daily basis, Markit collects more than 
a million CDS quotes contributed by more than 30 major market participants. The 
quotes are subject to a curve-based cleaning process that removes outliers and stale 
observations. Markit then computes a daily composite spread only if it has two or more 
contributors. Second, Markit is one of the most widely employed CDS databases in 
finance and economics literature. Papers that employ this dataset include Acharya and 
Johnson (2007), Jorion and Zhang (2007), Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009), and Hébert 
and Schreger (2017). I focus on the available universe of corporate and sovereign 5-
year CDS markets since the 5-year maturity is most liquid in the CDS market. These 
CDS are all denominated in US dollars, eliminating confounding pricing effects from 
exchange rates in CDS rates. 
 I apply several filters to the CDS data to mitigate bias from missing or stale 
data, following the existing literature (Bedendo and Colla, 2015; Berndt and Obreja, 
2010; Schneider, Sögner, and Veža, 2010). First, I exclude CDS for which the longest 
series of consecutive missing rates are more than two weeks. Second, I exclude CDS 
for which the percentage of missing data exceeds 15% of the whole period, which 





either sovereign or corporate CDS rates. Finally, I require every country included in 
the sample to have a minimum of four companies. I exclude Colombia, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Poland, and Turkey because of this restriction on CDS transaction 
sufficiency. I identify 9 EMs that have sufficient publicly-traded CDS data available in 
the corporate, sovereign, and banking sectors. They are Brazil, Chile, China, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand. 
 After CDS data cleaning, I collect news releases concerning credit risk on the 
corporations in my sample of CDS over the period from 1/1/2014 to 12/29/2016. To 
avoid “cherry-picking,” I search for news releases through Dow Jones’ Factiva News 
Search database, commonly used in event studies. This database covers business news 
articles from over 8,000 sources, including national and international newspapers, 
magazines, wire services, websites, and industry (trade) sources. I use corporate names 
as the identifier and collect their news releases under four categories related to credit 
risk: corporate actions, financial performance, corporate financial difficulty, and 
corporate funding. Combining the two data sources, I identify a total of 61 corporations 
in the 9 EMs mentioned above. For the main analysis, I use a one-day event window. 
Consider a news release at 2pm EDT on Wednesday, November 9, 2016. The one-day 
event window, applied to this event, would imply examining the CDS rate change from 
the close on Tuesday, November 8 to the close on Wednesday, November 9. If the news 
is released after 4pm EDT (i.e., after the market closes), it would be treated as news 
released early morning on Wednesday, November 9. I also check the robustness of my 





 To screen out corporate shocks that might be correlated with sovereign or 
aggregate shocks, I exclude event days when there are sovereign credit rating actions 
or commentaries released from either of the three major credit rating agencies: Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch Group. A total of 2,300 observations out of 36,992 
are dropped from the sample for this reason. Table A.2 summarizes detailed 
information on the corporations included in the sample. They operate in 7 sectors 
defined by Markit: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, energy, 
industrials, telecommunications, and utilities. I match the data on corporate CDS rates 
to the CDS rates on sovereigns for the countries in which the corporations’ headquarters 
reside. I drop observations with missing corporate or sovereign CDS data. 
 The final sample consists of 10,201 observations for 61 corporations in 9 EMs. 
Table 1.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the final sample, broken down by each 
sovereign. Overall, there are substantial variations in both corporate and sovereign CDS 
rates within and across countries. Russia and Brazil are the most represented countries, 
comprising about 36% and 20% of the sample, respectively.  Other countries have 
reasonably large shares in the sample as well.[8] 
 
[8] For comparison, summary statistics for all dates, including dates without major corporate news 






Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for High-frequency Event-study Analysis 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Med. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Whole Sample         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)      10201 -0.002 0.042 -1.716 -0.001 0.832 -8.508 348.9 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)   10201 0.003 0.032 -0.163 0.003 0.192 0.167 5.831 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)            9107 0.000 0.018 -0.112 0.000 0.125 -0.053 7.759 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠) 10201 -0.001 0.030 -0.847 0.000 0.378 -5.873 191.4 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)   9986 0.001 0.012 -0.129 0.000 0.109 0.328 22.15 
Brazil         
No. of news per corp. - 232 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  2089 -0.002 0.054 -0.780 -0.001 0.832 -2.678 110.8 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  2089 0.004 0.032 -0.133 0.004 0.138 0.168 5.366 
Chile         
No. of news per corp. - 69 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  481 0.000 0.024 -0.089 0.000 0.348 6.249 91.78 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  481 0.005 0.032 -0.102 0.005 0.109 0.140 4.508 
China         
No. of news per corp. - 120 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  838 -0.005 0.068 -1.716 -0.000 0.250 -19.25 489.0 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  838 0.005 0.025 -0.079 0.003 0.116 0.512 4.581 
Malaysia         
No. of news per corp. - 113 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  792 -0.002 0.030 -0.091 -0.004 0.155 0.653 5.163 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  792 0.001 0.029 -0.088 0.000 0.162 0.606 5.794 
Mexico         
No. of news per corp. - 151 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  1056 -0.001 0.025 -0.116 -0.002 0.146 0.484 5.679 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  1056 0.003 0.033 -0.112 0.002 0.147 0.175 4.253 
Philippines         
No. of news per corp. - 95 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  378 -0.010 0.073 -0.497 -0.002 0.298 -2.560 20.11 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  378 0.004 0.025 -0.052 0.003 0.096 0.478 3.911 
Russia         
No. of news per corp. - 366 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 3660 -0.002 0.030 -0.462 -0.000 0.353 -0.815 34.99 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 3660 0.001 0.035 -0.163 0.003 0.192 0.078 6.164 
South Africa         
No. of news per corp. - 102 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  510 -0.004 0.037 -0.390 -0.001 0.197 -2.709 34.89 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  510 0.004 0.024 -0.070 0.003 0.092 0.247 3.900 
Thailand         
No. of news per corp. - 79 - - - - - - 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  397 -0.004 0.029 -0.151 -0.002 0.211 0.209 13.03 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  397 0.002 0.023 -0.073 0.001 0.104 0.644 5.860 
Note: CDS data cover dates that have news releases from 1/1/2014 to 12/29/2016.  
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) and ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) are the daily log change in corporate CDS rates and 
sovereign CDS rates, respectively.  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) is the daily log change in the closing price of a 





price associated with each corporation.  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠) is the daily log change in the country’s 
foreign exchange rate against the US dollar. 
Source: CDS data are from Markit. Stock index data are from Bloomberg. Commodity prices and 
exchange rates are from Thomas Reuters Datastream.  
 
1.3.3 Discussion of Main Results 
In Section 1.3.3.1, I present and analyze the estimates of spillovers from corporate to 
sovereign credit risk. In Section 1.3.3.2, I discuss three possible channels through 
which corporate credit risk may transmit to sovereign credit risk. 
1.3.3.1 Corporate to Sovereign Credit Risk Spillovers 
Table 1.3 presents the results from estimating the baseline regression Equation 1. The 
independent variable is the daily log change in the sovereign CDS rate, and the sample 
consists of dates when there are news releases concerning corporate credit risk. Column 
(1) includes only the log change in corporate CDS rates and time fixed effects as 
independent variables, while column (2) adds country fixed effects. The coefficient on 
corporate CDS rates has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant. Next, 
I add changes in stock prices, relevant commodity prices, and exchange rates against 
the USD. Results in columns (7) and (8) indicate that, on average, a surprise 10% 
increase in corporate CDS rates due to negative news leads to about a 3.0% increase in 
sovereign CDS rates, and these estimates are statistically significant. This extent of risk 
transfer is also economically significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
corporate CDS rates (0.042) corresponds to an increase in sovereign CDS rates of 0.39 
standard deviations ((0.297 × 0.042)/0.032 = 0.39, see Table 1.2).  
These results provide empirical support to models suggesting that idiosyncratic 





foundation for aggregate shocks (Gabaix, 2011; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-
Salehi, 2017; Carvalho and Grassi, 2019). I include day fixed effects in all model 
specifications to control for any common macroeconomic factors. The comparison of 
estimations with and without country fixed effects shows that my results are robust 
against controlling for unobservable and time-invariant country-specific factors. I 
correct all standard errors for possible heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation by 
adopting Newey-West variance estimates.[9] 
 The coefficients of the control variables also have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. An increase in stock prices, an indicator of better expectations 
about future economic activity, lowers sovereign risk. Declining commodity prices 
push up sovereign risk since they erode the sovereign’s tax revenue. Finally, an 
increased exchange rate (i.e., depreciation against the US dollar) makes paying down 
sovereign debt denominated in the US dollar considerably more expensive, thus 
elevating that emerging market’s sovereign risk. 
 





Table 1.3: High-frequency Event-study Analysis - Baseline Regression Results 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗     0.335*** 0.335*** 0.309*** 0.307*** 0.305*** 0.303*** 0.298*** 0.297*** 
 (5.54) (5.58) (4.95) (4.97) (4.95) (4.97) (4.93) (4.95) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗               -0.533*** -0.542*** -0.520*** -0.529*** -0.505*** -0.513*** 
   (-16.52) (-16.96) (-16.34) (-16.76) (-16.54) (-17.01) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗     -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
     (-5.88) (-5.81) (-6.13) (-6.06) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗          0.271*** 0.268*** 
       (7.86) (7.90) 
Country FE N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 10,201 10,201 9,107 9,107 9,107 9,107 9,107 9,107 
Note: t statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” heteroskedastic- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard 





1.3.3.2 Discussion of Risk Transmission Channels 
Having established that there indeed exist credit risk spillovers from the corporate 
sector to sovereigns, I next explore the channels through which such spillovers could 
take place. I highlight possible mechanisms in this section. First, I investigate the fiscal 
channel by testing whether the credit risk of corporations with stronger ties to their 
domestic government affects their sovereign credit risk more. Second, I explore the 
size channel by testing whether big corporations, in terms of total assets, total liabilities, 
and corporate income tax payments, affect sovereign credit risk more. Third, I examine 
the financial channel by testing whether stressed domestic banks transfer additional 
credit risk to their sovereigns. 
 The fiscal channel. One channel for how non-financial corporations may 
transmit credit risk to their sovereigns could be that the sovereigns have such 
substantial ownership in these corporations that governments implicitly guarantee their 
debt to prevent them from falling. A distressed SOE sector increases the probability 
that some of its contingent liabilities will crystallize on the government’s balance sheet. 
The amount of the implicit government guarantee could be sizable: Jin, Wang, and 
Zhang (2018) exploit the first default by a large SOE, Baoding Tianwei, in China’s 
onshore bond market and find that implicit government guarantees account for at least 
1.75% of bond value. Government guarantees in EMs are not uncommon as well. Table 
A.5 in the Appendix lists some recent examples of government bailouts of SOEs. In 
addition to the SOEs, corporations that operate in sectors where governments are 
influential in the purchasing or regulatory process may have close ties to the 





Masulis, and McConnell (2006) document that politically connected firms are 
significantly more likely to be bailed out in a crisis than otherwise similar non-
connected firms.  
To test these two hypotheses, I construct two dummy variables and interact each 
with corporate CDS shocks. The first dummy variable is state ownership at the firm 
level, SOEi, and is time-invariant throughout my sample period. I would expect that 
adverse credit shocks to SOEs would increase sovereign credit risk to a larger extent 
than for non-SOEs. I collect corporations’ most recent ultimate state ownership 
information from their official websites and the Worldscope database (see Table 
A.2).[10] The pairwise correlations between corporate and sovereign CDS rates among 
SOEs (defined using 100% ultimate state ownership) is 0.96 while that of non-SOEs is 
0.89, suggesting that sovereign credit risk moves more closely with SOE than non-SOE 
credit risk. Motivated by this finding, I run the following regression: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  
                                           +𝛾𝛾 · 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
          +𝜃𝜃∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Equation 2 
where i, j, and t denote corporate, sovereign, and time on a daily basis, respectively. 
In this subsection, I focus on estimates of Equation 2 using a cutoff of 100% 
ultimate state ownership: the SOEi dummy takes on the value one if the corporation’s 
state entity ultimately holds 100% of this corporation’s stock, and zero otherwise. Other 
 
[10] Ultimate ownership is different from direct ownership in that ultimate ownership traces the control 
chains of related companies. For example, suppose Company A is wholly owned by Company B, and 
50% of Company B's stock certificates are directly held by its sovereign entity in its name. Then the 
direct state ownership of company A is zero, while the ultimate ownership is 50%. Compared to direct 
state ownership, ultimate state ownership more precisely reflects the government's control over an SOE. 





cutoffs are used in robustness tests. Ten out of 61 corporations in my sample have 100% 
ultimate state ownership (see Table A.2). The interaction term 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ·
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 aims to capture the extra spillover effect from corporate risk 
to sovereign risk through the government’s implicit guarantees. 
 In addition to the SOE dummy at the firm level, I construct a time-invariant 
“government dependence” variable, varying across both sectors and countries, 
following Pellegrino and Zingales (2017). The variable measures how much each 
sector is dependent on government contracts, regulations, and interventions. The story 
behind this measure is that corporations in more government-dependent sectors are 
more likely to maintain a close relationship with their government, thus becoming more 
“politically connected.” According to Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), 
politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out in a crisis than 
otherwise similar non-connected firms. To construct this variable, I count news articles 
by sector and by country from Factiva, using its industry tags. The sectors of firms in 
my sample are matched with Factiva’s 17 industry tags.[11] The variable “government 
dependence” is defined, for each sector q in country j, as the ratio of the number of 
news articles having “Government Contracts” or “Regulation/Government Policy” as 
their topics, to the total number of news articles for sector q. I consider all news outlets 
covered by Factiva over the period from 1/1/2014 to 12/29/2016. Table A.6 reports 
summary statistics for the “government dependence” variable. 
 
[11] Factiva's industry tags are Agriculture, Automotive, Basic Materials/Resources, Business/Consumer 
Services, Consumer Goods, Energy, Financial Services, Health Care/Life Sciences, Industrial Goods, 
Leisure/Arts/Hospitality, Media/Entertainment, Real Estate/Construction, Retail/Wholesale, 





 Suppose a sector has a “government dependence” value higher than the 75th 
percentile of sectors in the sample for that country. In that case, it is considered as 
“government-dependent,” and I create an indicator variable “GOV” that equals one for 
government-dependent sector-country pairs, and zero otherwise. Table A.7 reports the 
government-dependent sectors for each country. Similar to the regression using the 
SOE dummy, I interact GOV with my original corporate CDS variable to investigate if 
corporations in government-dependent sectors affect their sovereign’s credit risk more 
strongly: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
                                                +𝜁𝜁 · 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   
            +𝜃𝜃∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Equation 3 
where i, q, j, and t denote corporate, sector, sovereign, and time on a daily basis, 
respectively.  
The interaction term 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  captures the extra 
spillover effect from corporate risk to sovereign risk through the dependence of 
government business. 
 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.4 present the results from estimating Equation 
2 and Equation 3, including the interactions of corporate risk and indicators of 
dependence on the government. The results in column (1) support my hypothesis on 
SOEs, with a statistically significant difference at the 1% level between the impact of 
SOE and non-SOE corporations on sovereign risk. The coefficient suggests that a 10% 
increase in non-SOE corporate CDS rates leads to a 2.7% rise in sovereign CDS within 





rates. Among publicly traded corporations included in the sample, higher ultimate state 
ownership contributes to a more significant spillover between corporate and sovereign 
risk. Results defining SOEs based on direct state ownership are quantitatively very 
similar.  
Meanwhile, the coefficient of the “GOV” interaction term is statistically 
significant as well, as shown in column (2). The results indicate that being in a 
government-dependent sector, and thus having closer political connections, does 
contribute more to the spillover effect, causing an additional 3.0% rise in sovereign 
CDS rates. 
The size channel. The second transmission mechanism is that some firms are 
“too big to fail”. Certain corporations are so large that their failure would be a disaster 
to the government or aggregate economic activity so that the government is likely to 
support them in periods of difficulty. Corporations benefit from such protective policies 
not because of their direct relationship with government, like SOEs, but because they 
are large enough to be systemically important. Their failures may cause a substantial 
decline in tax revenue or aggregate output, either way leading to higher sovereign credit 
risk. Additionally, systemically important firms may have more spillovers to the 
sovereign simply because adverse shocks to large firms hurt the overall economy and 
tax revenue even if there are never bailouts.   
To test this hypothesis, I match corporate CDS data with firm-level annual 
balance sheet data from Worldscope and construct three firm-level “SIZE” dummy 
variables to measure the relative size of a corporation in the sample: “ASST”, “LIAB”, 





assets across 2014 to 2016 has a higher than 75th percentile level of total assets among 
all corporations in that country sample, and zero otherwise. Similarly, “LIAB” and 
“TAX” are assigned to one or zero based on a corporation’s levels of total liabilities and 
corporate income tax payments, respectively. I interact these SIZE dummies with my 
original corporate CDS variable to investigate if relatively larger corporations affect 
their sovereign’s credit risk more strongly: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
                                               +𝜂𝜂 · 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   
            +𝜃𝜃∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Equation 4 
where i, j, and t denote corporate, sovereign, and time on a daily basis, respectively. 
As presented in columns (3) - (5) of Table 1.4, the credit risk of large 
corporations does significantly impact their sovereign credit risk more than that of 
smaller corporations. Being a corporation with total assets in the top quartile of its 
country leads to an additional 3.8% rise in sovereign CDS rates when corporate CDS 
rates increase by 10%. If I measure a corporation’s size by total liabilities or corporate 
income tax payments, being large (i.e., in the top quartile of its country sample) leads 
to about an additional 3.5% and 2.6% rise in sovereign CDS rates, respectively. In the 
robustness tests, I also use the 50th percentiles (median) as the cutoff of a corporation 
being large or not. The results are no longer significant (see Table 1.8). This 
comparison indicates that corporations need to be very large to have such an extra 
spillover effect on their sovereigns. 
The financial channel. The third possible risk transmission mechanism is 





local corporate debt, banks could experience stress or even bankruptcy when their 
corresponding corporate borrowers have difficulty paying back loans. Sovereign credit 
risk may be elevated because of a stressed banking sector, especially if there are 
potential bailouts of banks. Therefore, this indirect corporate-bank- sovereign channel 
could amplify the adverse effects of the direct corporate-sovereign spillover.  
To test this hypothesis, I collect the CDS rates on banks headquartered in each 
sovereign. I identify a total of 53 banks with publicly traded CDS (see Table A.3). I do 
not have enough information to identify relationships between specific banks and 
corporations (e.g., taking loans and selling bonds). Therefore, I match the equal-
weighted average of CDS for banks headquartered in that sovereign to the CDS rates 
of corporations headquartered in the same sovereign. I drop observations with missing 
bank CDS data. Then, I use bank names as the identifier and collect their news releases 
related to the financial market from the Factiva News Search database. I construct a 
dummy variable at the country level, “BANK”, which takes the value of one if any 
sample banks in that country have news release on that date, and zero otherwise. I then 
interact this BANK dummy with my bank CDS variable and add the interaction term to 
the baseline model Equation 1 to investigate if stressed banking sectors amplify the 
spillovers from corporate to sovereign risk: 
 where i, j, and t denote corporate, sovereign, and time on a daily basis, respectively. 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  
                                        +𝜅𝜅 · 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   






 Column (6) of Table 1.4 presents the regression results. The coefficients of the 
interaction terms are statistically significant with positive signs, suggesting that a 
stressed banking sector indeed amplifies the spillover effects.  
I also construct two country-level measures of financial development and test 
whether a more developed banking sector in emerging markets can mitigate spillovers 
to some extent. The first measure, DEPj, is a proxy for a country’s dependence on 
banks. Following Levine (2002) and Augustin et al. (2018), I construct this measure by 
taking the ratio of each country’s aggregate private sector bank deposits to the country’s 
stock market capitalization. A ratio higher than one suggests that the country’s financial 
system is bank-based. I obtain data from the Financial Structure Database published by 
the World Bank. The second measure, CREj, aims to capture the importance of a 
country’s banking sector to the corporate sector. I use data from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and calculate bank credit to the private non-financial 
sector as a percentage of total credit to the private non-financial sector for each country. 
I first calculate these two measures at an annual frequency and then average them over 
2014 to 2016 for a given country to get a long-run sense of how much businesses in a 
country rely on banks rather than the market for financing. Table A.8 in the appendix 
shows their summary statistics.[12] [13] 
 
[12] No data on CRE is available for the Philippines. 
[13] According to BIS' definitions, credit covers loans and debt securities; the private non-financial sector 
includes non-financial corporations (both private-owned and public-owned), households and non-profit 
institutions serving households as defined in the System of National Accounts 2008. BIS has no data 
covering only non-financial corporations for emerging markets. The indicators used here are the closest 






Table 1.4: High-frequency Event-study Analysis – Risk Transmission Mechanisms 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   












Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                   0.268*** 0.286*** 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.221*** 0.293*** 
 (4.60) (4.78) (3.83) (3.74) (3.70) (4.66) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       0.352***      
 (3.55)      
𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       0.297**     
  (2.27)     
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗         0.376***    
   (6.04)    
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗          0.352***   
    (5.28)   
𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗           0.261***  
     (3.23)  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗          0.046** 
      (2.12) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                   0.094*** 
      (11.15) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                              -0.508*** -0.510*** -0.479*** -0.484*** -0.493*** -0.486*** 
 (-18.06) (-17.46) (-20.23) (-19.81) (-19.13) (-16.67) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                    -0.088*** -0.092*** -0.084*** -0.080*** -0.090*** -0.090*** 
 (-6.02) (-6.08) (-6.37) (-5.91) (-6.28) (-5.98) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.253*** 0.267*** 0.242*** 0.237*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 
 (7.98) (8.02) (8.41) (8.21) (8.32) (7.81) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 





Note: Column (1) interacts corporate CDS with SOE, which is a dummy for whether the 
corporation has 100% ultimate state ownership, and column (2) includes country fixed effects. 
Column (2) interacts corporate CDS with a dummy variable GOV, which takes a value of one 
if a corporation operates in a sector with a “government dependence” value higher than the 75th 
percentile of sectors in the country sample, and zero otherwise. Column (3) interacts corporate 
CDS with ASST, a dummy for whether the corporation has total assets higher than the 75th 
percentile of its country level. Column (4) interacts corporate CDS with LIAB, a dummy for 
whether the corporation has total liabilities higher than the 75th percentile of its country level. 
Column (5) interacts corporate CDS with TAX, a dummy for whether the corporation has total 
taxation higher than the 75th percentile of its country level. Column (6) interacts bank CDS 
with a dummy variable BANK, which takes a value of one if country j on date t experiences a 
news release on any of the banks included in the sample and zero otherwise. T statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
As I did with the fiscal channel, I interact these two measures with the original 
corporate CDS variable to investigate the hypothesized mitigating effect of financial 
development on spillovers. Table A.9 in the appendix shows that the coefficients of the 
interaction terms are statistically significant with negative signs, suggesting that a 
larger banking sector compared to financial markets mitigate spillover effects to some 
extent.  
Relative Strength of Three Channels. I run the following regression, which 
includes all interaction terms for the three channels. The standard beta coefficients are 
reported so the relative strength of three channels can be directly compared.  
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  
                                               +𝛾𝛾1 · 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   
                                                  +𝛾𝛾2 · 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  
                                               +𝛾𝛾3 · 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
                                        +𝛾𝛾4 · 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
                                                          +𝜆𝜆∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +  𝜃𝜃∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  
Equation 6 





Table 1.5 presents the regression results with standard beta coefficients. 
Standardized beta coefficients show how many standard-deviation changes in the 
dependent variable with every change of one standard deviation in an independent 
variable. They make results comparable across different independent variables.  
The results first show that, among three transmission channels, the fiscal 
channel working through state ownership is the most prominent, indicating that being 
an SOE is most influential on sovereign credit risk among all firm characteristics. It is 
consistent with the rationale of credit rating actions against EM sovereign debt by major 
credit rating agencies (see Table 1.1 for selected examples). Secondly, being a large 
corporation measured by its total assets and total liabilities also has a significant impact 
on changes in sovereign CDS rates. A stressed banking sector has a weakly impact on 
sovereign credit risk. Thirdly, either being in a government-dependent sector or a large 
corporation measure by income tax payment does not significantly elevate sovereign 





Table 1.5: Relative Strength of Three Transmission Channels 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Independent variable (1) (2) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                      0.210*** 0.205*** 
 (3.22) (3.19) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  0.201*** 0.203*** 
 (19.27) (19.44) 
𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 0.006 0.006 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 0.102*** 0.099*** 
 (2.67) (2.64) 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 0.134*** 0.136*** 
 (3.72) (3.77) 
𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 0.063 0.062 
 (1.32) (1.32) 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                0.017 0.019* 
 (1.59) (1.72) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                                   0.155*** 0.152*** 
 (11.72) (11.65) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                               -0.214*** -0.217*** 
 (-17.30) (-17.82) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                    -0.060*** -0.058*** 
 (-5.98) (-5.70) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.088*** 0.083*** 
 (8.42) (8.08) 
Country FE N Y 
Time FE Y Y 
Observations 8,988 8,988 
Note: standard beta coefficients are reported. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
“Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent, respectively. 
 
1.3.4 Robustness Tests 
In this section, I conduct several tests to check the robustness of my results. First, I run 
regressions with different state ownership, government dependence, and size cutoffs. 
Second, I run an alternative specification to Equation 1, with a dummy indicating news 
releases. Third, I run regressions with a two-day event window. Lastly, I run a 
falsification regression using lagged daily log changes in sovereign CDS rates as the 
dependent variable. My main results on the spillover effect from corporate to sovereign 





 Different SOE Cutoffs. Besides using 100% ultimate state ownership as the 
cutoff for defining an SOE, I also try 30%, 50%, and 80% cutoffs to see whether 
corporations’ state ownership needs to be as high as 100% to have an extra spillover 
effect on sovereign credit risk. Regression results, reported in Table 1.6, show that the 
credit risk of corporations with more than 80% ultimate state ownership also spills over 
more to sovereign credit risk than corporations with ultimate state ownership lower 
than 80%. However, the size of the extra spillover is smaller, compared to the case 
using 100% ultimate state ownership (0.280 vs. 0.352). Meanwhile, regressions using 
30% and 50% cutoffs do not yield significant coefficients of the SOE interaction term, 
suggesting that lower levels of ultimate state ownership do not lead to the perception 
of implicit government guarantees and consequent elevated sovereign credit risk. 
  
Table 1.6: Main Regression Results - Different SOE Cutoffs 
 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Independent variable 30% 50% 80% 100% 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                           0.193*** 0.259*** 0.271*** 0.268*** 
 (6.07) (6.59) (4.55) (4.60) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗           0.217 0.091 0.280*** 0.352*** 
 (1.41) (0.60) (3.02) (3.55) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                  -0.494*** -0.509*** -0.509*** -0.508*** 
 (-11.32) (-14.24) (-17.96) (-18.06) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                        -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.088*** 
 (-5.49) (-5.96) (-6.06) (-6.02) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.259*** 0.265*** 0.256*** 0.253*** 
 (6.39) (6.92) (8.06) (7.98) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,107 9,107 9,107 9,107 
Note: columns (1) – (3) interact corporate CDS with SOE30, SOE50, SOE80, which indicate whether the 
corporation has state ownership strictly higher than 30%, 50%, and 80%, respectively. Column (4) 
repeats, as a comparison, the baseline results where corporate CDS is interacted with SOE using 100% 
state ownership as the cutoff. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” 
heteroskedastic- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance 





Different “Government-Dependent” Sector Cutoff. Besides using the 75th 
percentile to define “government-dependent” sectors, I also use the 50th percentile (i.e., 
median) as a cutoff to define the dummy variable GOV. GOV50 equals one if a 
corporation operates in a sector with a higher than the median level of the “government 
dependence” variable among all sectors in that country, and zero otherwise. Regression 
results are reported in Table 1.7. Contrary to the results shown in columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 1.4, the coefficients on interaction terms are no longer significant. It indicates 
that a sector’s “government dependence” indicator has to reach at least the top quartile 
among all sectors in a country to be substantial enough to cause extra corporate-
sovereign spillovers. 
 
Table 1.7: Main Regression Results - Different “Government Dependence” Cutoffs 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Independent variable 50th percentile 75th percentile 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                       0.283*** 0.288*** 
 (3.96) (4.68) 
𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗      0.069 0.304** 
 (0.78) (2.15) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                               -0.511*** -0.508*** 
 (-17.82) (-16.92) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                    -0.092*** -0.090*** 
 (-6.11) (-5.83) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.266*** 0.264*** 
 (8.14) (7.99) 
Country FE Y Y 
Time FE Y Y 
Observations 9,107 9,107 
Note: columns (1) and (2) interact corporate CDS with a dummy variable GOV, which takes a 
value of one if a corporation operates in a sector that has a “government dependence” value 
higher than the 50th and 75th percentile of sectors in the country sample, and zero otherwise, 
respectively. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC 







Different Size Cutoff. Besides using the 75th percentile to define a corporation 
as large or not, I also use the 50th percentile (i.e., median) as a cutoff. Table 1.8 presents 
results when I interact corporate CDS with “ASST”, “LIAB”, and “TAX”, which are 
dummies for whether the corporation has total assets, total liabilities, and corporate 
income tax payments higher than the 50th percentile of the sample corporations in that 
country, respectively. Corporations with total assets larger than their country median 
spill over additional credit risk to their sovereigns. However, corporations with total 
liabilities or corporate income tax larger than their country’s median level do not show 
an additional spillover effect. The results suggest that corporations’ borrowing or 
contribution to government tax revenue has to reach at least the top quartile to be 





Table 1.8: Main Regression Results - Different Size Cutoffs 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   
 Total Assets Total Liabilities Taxation 
 50th percentile 75th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                              0.112*** 0.198*** 0.196*** 0.199*** 0.228*** 0.221*** 
 (3.10) (3.83) (6.59) (3.74) (4.93) (3.70) 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗          0.413*** 0.376***     
 (7.31) (6.04)     
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗            0.157 0.352***   
   (1.47) (5.28)   
𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗               0.115 0.261*** 
     (1.04) (3.23) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                      -0.460*** -0.479*** -0.506*** -0.484*** -0.511*** -0.493*** 
  (-19.14) (-20.23) (-14.90) (-19.81) (-15.85) (-19.13) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                           -0.081*** -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.080*** -0.091*** -0.090*** 
 (-6.10) (-6.37) (-5.60) (-5.91) (-5.72) (-6.28) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.231*** 0.242*** 0.263*** 0.237*** 0.267*** 0.257*** 
 (8.11) (8.41) (7.09) (8.21) (7.55) (8.32) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,107 9,107 9,107 9,107 9,107 9,107 
Note: columns (1) and (2) interact corporate CDS with ASST, which is a dummy for whether the corporation has total assets higher than 50th  and 
75th percentile of its country level, respectively; columns (3) - (4) and columns (5) – (6) do similar interactions with LIAB and TAX, respectively. T 
statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” heteroskedastic- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. *, 





 Specification with News Dummy. Besides using a high-frequency event-study 
which only includes dates with corporate news releases, I also conduct an alternative 
specification to Equation 1. I create an indicator variable NEWS that equals one on a 
date with a news release and zero otherwise, and interact it with the change of corporate 
CDS rates: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
                                                  +𝜂𝜂 · 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   
            +𝜃𝜃∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Equation 7 
where i, j, and t denote corporate, sovereign, and time on a daily basis, respectively. 
The regression includes observations for all days but focuses on the correlation 
between sovereign and corporate CDS on days with news releases. In this case, β would 
measure the correlation between sovereign and corporate CDS on a typical day without 
a corporate news release; and η would be the coefficient of interest, measuring the extra 
correlation between sovereign and corporate CDS on a day with a corporate news 
release.  This specification allows me to contrast the “causal” effect of corporate CDS 
on sovereign CDS on dates with news releases with the “noncausal” baseline 
correlation between the two variables on other dates.  This would give my estimates a 
natural difference-in-difference interpretation. Table 1.9 reports the estimation results. 
The coefficients on the interaction term are positive and significant at the 1-percent 
level, consistent with the results in the high-frequency event study analysis. Table A.10 
reports the estimation results with standardized beta coefficients and with all channels 
included. The coefficient on triple interaction term of SOE is significantly positive at 





Table 1.9: Regression Results with News Dummy 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗     0.227*** 0.219*** 0.213*** 0.206*** 
 (9.20) (7.66) (7.63) (7.60) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶     0.105*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 
 (14.19) (13.29) (13.30) (13.42) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗              -0.676*** -0.651*** -0.620*** 
  (-36.08) (-34.96) (-35.60) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   -0.142*** -0.135*** 
   (-11.86) (-12.13) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       0.431*** 
    (16.16) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 35,734 29,743 29,743 29,743 
Note: t statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” 
heteroskedastic- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Two-day Event Window. Sometimes market players act before the formal 
release of news recorded in Factiva. This may be because some news outlets have more 
timely reporting of corporate news. For example, www.upstreamonline.com is a 
website that has the timeliest reporting of oil companies. Time zone differences can 
also lead to market players in some continents act faster than others. To consider such 
effect, I use a two-day event window to check the robustness of my results. This time 
frame is also used in Hébert and Schreger (2017). Consider a news release at 2pm EDT 
on Wednesday, November 9, 2016. The two-day event window, applied to this event, 
would use the CDS rate change from the close on Monday, November 7, to the close 
on Wednesday, November 9th. For this specification, two-day windows are applied to 





day event-windows side by side. Two sets of results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar, indicating that there is evidence for such a market anticipation effect. Results 
on three transmission channels are reported in Table A.11 - A.13 in the Appendix.  
Falsification Test. If changes in corporate CDS rates are driving variation in 
sovereign CDS rates only on the day of the news release, I should not observe a 
significant impact of corporate CDS changes on lagged sovereign CDS changes. Table 
1.11 reports the baseline regression results using sovereign CDS changes  and lagged 
sovereign CDS changes side by side. While the coefficients of corporate CDS are still 
statistically significant, the magnitudes are only about one-third the size. Table A.14 - 
A.16 in the Appendix report the regression results for this falsification test for three 
channels. For tests of the fiscal channel, the main coefficients on corporate CDS rates 
are much smaller than those reported in the main results, while the state ownership and 
government-dependent sector interaction terms are no longer statistically significant. 
For tests of the size channel, the coefficient of corporate CDS rates is no longer 
statistically significant. Although the coefficients of the three interaction terms are still 
statistically significant, their magnitudes are much smaller. For tests of financial 






Table 1.10: Two-day Event Window Results - Baseline Regression  

















Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗     0.335*** 0.380*** 0.307*** 0.355*** 0.303*** 0.326*** 0.297*** 0.317*** 
 (5.58) (5.41) (4.97) (4.74) (4.97) (4.68) (4.95) (4.95) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗               -0.542*** -0.610*** -0.529*** -0.590*** -0.513*** -0.561*** 
   (-16.96) (-15.58) (-16.76) (-15.41) (-17.01) (-15.73) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗     -0.096*** -0.121*** -0.093*** -0.112*** 
     (-5.81) (-7.52) (-6.06) (-7.54) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗          0.268*** 0.346*** 
       (7.90) (6.66) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 10,201 10,188 9,107 9,020 9,107 9,020 9,107 9,020 
Note: columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report baseline regression results using a one-day event window. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report baseline 
regression results using a two-day event window. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” heteroskedastic- and 





Table 1.11: Falsification Test Results - Baseline Regression  
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗      0.335*** 0.092** 0.307*** 0.090** 0.303*** 0.090** 0.297*** 0.079** 
 (5.58) (2.44) (4.97) (2.18) (4.97) (2.18) (4.95) (2.13) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗              -0.542*** -0.098*** -0.529*** -0.100*** -0.513*** -0.065** 
   (-16.96) (-3.19) (-16.76) (-3.24) (-17.01) (-2.11) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗     -0.096*** -0.009 -0.093*** 0.012 
     (-5.81) (-0.52) (-6.06) (0.76) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗          0.268*** 0.526*** 
       (7.90) (7.20) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 10,201 5,023 9,107 4,680 9,107 4,680 9,107 4,680 
Note: columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report baseline regression results using ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗  as the dependent variable. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
report baseline regression results using ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 as the dependent variable. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
“Newey-West” heteroskedastic- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 





1.4 Extreme Value Analysis: The Effects of Changes in Corporate Risk on 
Sovereign Risk 
To capture the spillover from corporate to sovereign risk, I use a form of extreme value 
analysis, as described in Forbes (2013), to examine the incidence and patterns in 
extreme changes in corporate CDS rates over time. More specifically, I identify the 
dates during the period from January 2014 to December 2016 when each corporate has 
an extreme-positive or extreme-negative change in CDS rates, defined as a change in 
the top or bottom 5th or 1st percentile of the distribution of that corporation’s changes 
in CDS rates. If extreme changes in corporate CDS rates have no impact on their 
sovereign, then there should be roughly a 5 or 1 percent possibility that the sovereign 
should experience extreme changes in CDS rates on the same day. However, if extreme 
changes in sovereign CDS rates are more likely when a corporate has extreme changes 
in CDS, it would suggest either spillovers or common shocks. Although this exercise 
cannot determine the direction of causality from corporate to sovereign, it can show the 
extent of co-movement. 
1.4.1 Methodology 
I estimate the conditional probability that a sovereign has an extreme change in its CDS 
rate on any day as a function of its corporate and bank counterparts, also having an 
extreme change in their CDS rates, as well as global shocks. The method helps 
disentangle the effect of global shocks from linkages between corporations and 
sovereigns. I include different observable global shocks at a daily frequency: the 





proxy for global financial volatility, and the US repo rate and TED spread. The formal 
specification is: 
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏�𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆 = 1� = 𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽 · 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾 · 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶 + 𝜁𝜁 · 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵) Equation 8 
where 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆  is a dummy equal to 1 if sovereign i experiences an extreme change 
(positive or negative) in its CDS rate on day t, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶  is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
corporation associated with sovereign i experiences an extreme change in its CDS rate 
on day t, and 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵 is a dummy equal to 1 if the average bank CDS rates associated with 
sovereign i experience an extreme change on day t. Global measures global shocks on 
day t. 
 Following Forbes (2013), the appropriate methodology to estimate Equation 8 
is determined by the cumulative distribution function of (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽 · 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾 ·
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶 + 𝜁𝜁 · 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵), 𝐹𝐹(∙). Because extreme changes in CDS rates occur irregularly, 𝐹𝐹(∙) 
is asymmetric. Therefore, I estimate Equation 8 using the complementary logarithmic 
(or cloglog) framework, which assumes that 𝐹𝐹(𝑧𝑧) = 1 − exp {−exp (𝑧𝑧)}  is the 
cumulative distribution function of the extreme value distribution. This distribution fits 
maximum likelihood models with dichotomous dependent variables coded as 0/1. I also 
cluster standard errors by country. 
1.4.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
The sample includes CDS data available in Markit from 1/1/2014 to 12/29/2016. The 
corporations and banks covered are the same as those listed in Table A.2 and Table 
A.3. To mitigate the effect of sovereign-bank linkages, I control for dates with extreme 





on sovereign credit ratings are excluded, which results in a total of 2,300 observations 
being dropped from the sample. Table 1.12 and Table 1.13  tabulate the incidence of 
extreme changes in both corporate and sovereign CDS rates for each country in the 
sample at the 5th-percentile and 1st-percentile thresholds, respectively. 
The coincidence of extreme changes in both CDS is only a rough proxy for 
spillovers from corporate to sovereign risk. The spillovers could run in the opposite 
direction; alternatively, the two sectors could experience substantial changes in risk 
simultaneously due to a global shock, such as commodity prices or U.S. monetary 
policy. To control for the effects of global shocks, I include a set of global variables in 
the regression. Global shocks are measured in absolute values since they are not 
expected to have linear effects. Table 1.14 reports descriptive statistics for measures of 





Table 1.12: Incidence of Extreme Changes in Corporate and Sovereign CDS Rates    
(5th-percentile Threshold) 
Dummy=1 if corporate 
experiences extreme change 
Dummy=1 if sovereign 
 experiences extreme change 
 
Brazil 0 1 Total 
0 4,871 343 5,214 
1 341 249 590 
Total 5,212 592 5,804 
Chile 0 1 Total 
0 4,871 343 5,214 
1 341 249 590 
Total 5,212 592 5,804 
China 0 1 Total 
0 3,278 253 3,531 
1 253 147 400 
Total 3,531 400 3,931 
Malaysia 0 1 Total 
0 3,756 146 3,902 
1 146 296 442 
Total 3,902 442 4,344 
Mexico 0 1 Total 
0 3,916 260 4,176 
1 260 214 474 
Total 4,176 474 4,650 
Philippines 0 1 Total 
0 1,548 156 1,704 
1 156 40 196 
Total 1,704 196 1,900 
Russia 0 1 Total 
0 5,427 295 5,722 
1 295 351 646 
Total 5,722 646 6,368 
South Africa 0 1 Total 
0 2,498 194 2,692 
1 194 108 302 
Total 2,692 302 2,994 
Thailand 0 1 Total 
0 2,508 190 2,698 
1 190 114 304 
Total 2,698 304 3,002 





Table 1.13: Incidence of Extreme Changes in Corporate and Sovereign CDS Rates    
(1st-percentile Threshold) 
Dummy=1 if corporate 
experiences extreme change 
Dummy=1 if sovereign 
 experiences extreme change 
 
Brazil 0 1 Total 
0 5,573 105 5,678 
1 105 21 126 
Total 5,678 126 5,804 
Chile 0 1 Total 
0 3,768 74 3,842 
1 74 10 84 
Total 3,842 84 3,926 
China 0 1 Total 
0 3,782 65 3,847 
1 65 19 84 
Total 3,847 84 3,931 
Malaysia 0 1 Total 
0 4,219 35 4,254 
1 35 55 90 
Total 4,254 90 4,344 
Mexico 0 1 Total 
0 4,488 62 4,550 
1 62 38 100 
Total 4,550 100 4,650 
Philippines 0 1 Total 
0 1,825 35 1,860 
1 35 5 40 
Total 1,860 40 1,900 
Russia 0 1 Total 
0 6,156 70 6,226 
1 70 72 142 
Total 6,226 142 6,368 
South Africa 0 1 Total 
0 2,881 49 2,930 
1 49 15 64 
Total 2,930 64 2,994 
Thailand 0 1 Total 
0 2,892 46 2,938 
1 46 18 64 
Total 2,938 64 3,002 





Table 1.14: Summary Statistics for Measures of Global Shocks  
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Daily change in 
Commodity Price 34,630 2.114 10.28 0.000 0.660 320.5 12.81 214.0 
Daily change in 
TED Spread 34,630 1.364 1.872 0.000 1.000 28.00 3.496 22.49 
Daily change in 
US Repo Rate 34,630 0.004 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.190 7.329 71.85 
Daily change in 
VIX 32,426 1.067 1.241 0.000 0.720 14.64 3.570 24.42 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and the Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
1.4.3 Discussion of Main Results 
Table 1.15 reports regression results including only extreme changes in corporate and 
bank CDS rates, and then including different combinations of controls for global 
shocks. For each specification, the estimates show that an extreme change in a 
corporate CDS rate is significantly and positively correlated with the probability of 
observing an extreme change in the associated sovereign CDS rate on that day. The 
coefficients indicate that the latter possibility increases by a factor of about 5.5 (i.e., 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐(1.872)-1). These results are robust to controlling for global shocks, suggesting that 
much of this joint coincidence results from contagion between corporations and their 
sovereigns or from local shocks. The effects are even more substantial (by a factor of 
16.7) when extreme values are defined using the 1st percentile instead of the 5th 
percentile as the threshold (see Table 1.16). Results for regressions with extreme values 
for bank CDS excluded are similar and are available in Table A.17 and Table A.18. 
 Similar to our high-frequency event-study analysis, I test the three possible 
transmission channels. For the fiscal channel, Table 1.17 shows that the additional 





with SOEs is statistically significant no matter which cutoff is used to define SOEs. 
SOEs and their sovereigns are especially likely to experience extreme changes in CDS 
rates at the same time. This result is more robust to the SOE threshold definition than 
the comparable result from the high-frequency event-study analysis. Meanwhile, the 
extra correlation from corporations operating in “government-dependent” sectors is 
only statistically significant when I use the 75th percentile as the cutoff to define the 
GOV dummy, not the 50th percentile.  For the size channel, Table 1.18 shows that 
extreme changes in CDS rates of corporations with total liabilities above the 75th 
percentile have an extra correlation with extreme changes in CDS rates of their 
sovereigns. When I define the size dummy by total assets and corporate income tax 
payments, the coefficients are weakly or not statistically significant. For the financial 
channel, Table 1.19 shows that the coefficient of the bank stress interaction term is not 
significant. It indicates that an extreme change in bank CDS rate when the country 
experiences financial market news releases does not contribute to more correlation with 





Table 1.15: Extreme Value Analysis - Results (5th-percentile Threshold) 
Dependent variable: a dummy=1 if the sovereign experiences an extreme change in CDS rate in day t 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes 1.989*** 1.988*** 1.963*** 1.960*** 1.872*** 
 (8.70) (8.70) (8.37) (8.42) (8.07) 
Dummy for bank CDS extreme changes 1.192*** 1.192*** 1.162*** 1.163*** 1.138*** 
 (4.10) (4.09) (3.99) (3.98) (4.09) 
Daily change in commodity price  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (5.72) (5.84) (5.74) (6.46) 
Daily change in TED spread     0.094*** 0.094*** 0.077*** 
   (6.55) (6.73) (5.12) 
Daily change in US Repo rate    -8.641** -7.351* 
    (-2.17) (-1.79) 
Daily change in VIX     1.999*** 
     (8.15) 
Observations 34,614 34,614 34,614 34,614 32,411 
Note: standard error clustered at the country level and z statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 





Table 1.16: Extreme Value Analysis - Results (1st-percentile Threshold) 
Dependent variable: a dummy=1 if the sovereign experiences an extreme change in CDS rate in day t 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes 3.008*** 3.004*** 2.950*** 2.948*** 2.814*** 
 (12.13) (12.08) (11.35) (11.83) (10.89) 
Dummy for bank CDS extreme changes 1.682*** 1.686*** 1.685*** 1.721*** 1.646*** 
 (5.72) (5.69) (6.06) (6.45) (6.51) 
Daily change in commodity price  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
  (3.13) (3.01) (2.87) (3.24) 
Daily change in TED spread     0.090*** 0.094*** 0.058 
   (2.60) (2.66) (1.60) 
Daily change in US Repo rate    -29.69 -28.95* 
    (-1.63) (-1.66) 
Daily change in VIX     0.175*** 
     (5.95) 
Observations 34,614 34,614 34,614 34,614 32,411 
Note: standard error clustered at the country level and z statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 






Table 1.17: Extreme Value Analysis Results – Fiscal Channel (5th-percentile Threshold) 
Dependent variable: a dummy=1 if the sovereign experiences an extreme change in CDS rate in day t  
 State Ownership  
(firm-level) 
Gov. Dependence  
(sector-level) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes 1.782*** 1.840*** 1.917*** 1.913*** 1.889*** 1.912*** 
 (7.42) (7.63) (8.91) (8.90) (8.46) (8.73) 
Dummy for bank CDS extreme changes 1.183*** 1.186*** 1.186*** 1.186*** 1.192*** 1.187*** 
 (4.14) (4.15) (4.16) (4.15) (4.23) (4.17) 
SOE30·Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes 0.356**      
 (2.28)      
SOE50·Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes  0.287**     
  (2.32)     
SOE80·Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes   0.220***    
   (2.77)    
SOE100·Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes    0.249***   
    (2.85)   
GOV50·Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes     0.192  
     (1.10)  
GOV75·Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes      0.442*** 
      (3.00) 
Daily change in commodity price 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.01) (2.99) (3.26) (3.30) (3.46) (3.27) 
Daily change in TED spread   0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) 
Daily change in US Repo rate -2.079 -2.082 -2.155 -2.150 -2.108 -2.062 
 (-1.47) (-1.48) (-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.47) (-1.39) 
Daily change in VIX -0.035** -0.035** -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** 
 (-2.08) (-2.08) (-2.17) (-2.16) (-2.12) (-2.15) 
Observations 34,628 34,628 34,628 34,628 34,628 34,628 
Note: columns (1) to (4) interact a dummy for corporate CDS extreme changes with different SOE, which is a dummy for whether the corporation has ultimate 
state ownership strictly higher than 30%, 50%, 80%, and wholly owned by the government (100%), respectively. Columns (5) and (6) interact a dummy for 
corporate CDS extreme changes with different GOV, which is a dummy for whether the corporation operates in a sector with “government dependence” variable 
higher than 50th and 75th percentile among all sectors in its country. Standard error clustered at the country level and z statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and 





Table 1.18: Extreme Value Analysis Results – Size Channel (5th-percentile 
Threshold) 
Dependent variable: a dummy=1 if the sovereign experiences an extreme change in CDS 
rate in day t 
 Total Total 
Taxation  Assets Liabilities 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes 1.842*** 1.822*** 1.842*** 
 (8.89) (8.93) (9.63) 
Dummy for bank CDS extreme changes 1.187*** 1.187*** 1.189*** 
 (4.15) (4.16) (4.18) 
ASST · Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes 0.279*   
(1.94)   
LIAB · Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes  0.293**  
 (2.30)  
TAX · Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes   0.170 
  (1.08) 
Daily change in commodity price   0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.40) (3.23) (3.21) 
Daily change in TED spread 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) 
Daily change in US Repo rate -2.043 -2.075 -2.031 
 (-1.46) (-1.49) (-1.44) 
Daily change in VIX   -0.035** -0.035** -0.035** 
 (-2.08) (-2.08) (-2.09) 
Observations 34,628 34,628 34,628 
Note: columns (1) interacts a dummy for corporate CDS extreme changes with ASST, which is a dummy 
for whether the corporation has total asset higher than the 75th percentile of its country level; columns 
(2) interacts a dummy for corporate CDS extreme changes with LIAB, which is a dummy for whether 
the corporation has total liabilities higher than 75th percentile of its country level; columns (3) interacts 
a dummy for corporate CDS extreme changes with TAX, which is a dummy for whether the corporation 
has total taxation higher than 75th percentile of its country level. Standard error clustered at the country 
level and z statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 






Table 1.19: Extreme Value Analysis Results - Financial Channel (5th-percentile 
Threshold) 
Dependent variable: a dummy=1 if the sovereign experiences an extreme change in 
CDS rate in day t 
 Bank Stress 
 Country-level 
Independent variable (1) 
Dummy for corp. CDS extreme changes 1.906*** 
 (6.40) 
BANK · Dummy for bank CDS extreme changes 0.102 
 (0.41) 
Dummy for bank CDS extreme changes 1.191*** 
(4.18) 
Daily change in commodity price   0.003*** 
 (3.41) 
Daily change in TED spread 0.004 
 (0.21) 
Daily change in US Repo rate -2.142 
 (-1.47) 
Daily change in VIX   -0.036** 
 (-2.09) 
Observations 34,628 
Note: column (1) interacts a dummy for bank CDS extreme changes with BANK, which takes 
a value of one if country j on date t experiences a news release on any of the banks included in 
the sample and zero otherwise. Standard error clustered at the country level and z statistics 




In this paper, I examine the link between credit risks of corporations and those of their 
sovereigns. I construct a novel data set that combines corporate- and sovereign-level 
daily data on CDS rates and daily corporate news in 9 EMs from 1/1/2014 to 
12/29/2016. Using this data set, I show that post-news changes in corporations’ CDS 
rates have a significant impact on changes in sovereign CDS rates. I treat daily news 





the effect of corporate credit risk on sovereign credit risk by constructing a one-day 
event window around each news release. The results indicate that potential government 
bailouts or other spillovers from SOEs, government-dependent firms, and large 
corporations may elevate sovereign credit risk in emerging markets. Stress in the 
domestic banking sector also contributes to credit risk spillovers from corporations to 
sovereigns. Being an SOE has the most prominent effect among all channels. 
Additionally, an extreme value analysis shows that extreme changes in 
sovereign CDS rates are more likely when SOEs, government-dependent firms, and 
large corporations in the same country also experience extreme changes in their CDS 
rates. These results are robust when I control for common global shocks and extreme 
changes in domestic bank CDS rates.  
Overall, I consider the spillovers of credit risk from SOEs, government-
dependent firms, and large corporations to sovereign credit risk in EMs as reflecting a 
significant cost of implicit government guarantees of private debt. I believe that 
incorporating the cost of such bailouts into measures of sovereign credit risk in EMs 









2 Chapter 2: Drivers of Sovereign CDS Rates in Emerging 




Understanding the drivers of sovereign credit risk in EMs is crucial given that EMs are 
about ten times more likely to default on sovereign debt than are their advanced peers, 
and sovereign defaults are associated with deep recessions and restricted accessibility 
to global credit market (see Mendoza and Yue, 2012; Arteta and Hale, 2007). Literature 
has well documented a combination of domestic and external factors that could affect 
EMs’ sovereign credit risk. [14] For EMs, is the sovereign credit risk mainly driven by 
country-specific or global factors? There may not be a simple answer to this question 
due to the outbreak of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which started as 
a downturn in the U.S. subprime mortgage market but quickly spread to the rest of the 
world as a severe economic crisis. The roles of country-specific and global factors in 
affecting EMs’ sovereign CDS rates may have changed before, during, and after the 
GFC. 
To get an idea of how EMs’ sovereign CDS rates evolved around the GFC 
period, Figure 2.1 plots the equal-weighted average of sovereign CDS rates for a 
sample of 17 EMs against the daily adjusted closing price of the S&P 500 Index in 
Figure 2.1. The latter measures the stock performance of 500 large companies listed on 
stock exchanges in the U.S. and serves as an indicator of the global financial market. 
The figure shows that between the start of my sample period and the start of the GFC 
 





on August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas halted redemptions on three investment funds, 
the average level of sovereign CDS rates in EMs gradually decreased. This could be a 
sign of the economic maturity reached by their domestic economies.[15] During the 
crisis period (the grey area in the figure), the dip of the U.S. stock market index was 
accompanied by a hike of EMs’ average sovereign CDS rates. After the GFC ended 
following the second quarter of 2009, the negative relation between these two time 
series is not so obvious.[16] One could argue that the U.S. stock market, among other 
global factors, continued to exert a significant impact on the pricing of EMs’ sovereign 
CDS rates during this period, or that country-specific determinants took back their 
dominant role as the economy returned. 
This chapter aims to examine such structural changes using daily data on 
sovereign CDS rates of 17 EMs and a relatively comprehensive list of potential 
explanatory variables from July 2004 to December 2017. The variables cover possible 
drivers of sovereign CDS rates at both country-specific (or local) and global levels. The 
local drivers included in the study are (1) the stock market return, (2) the exchange rate 
against the U.S. dollar, and (3) foreign currency reserves. The global drivers, which 
intend to reflect global-market conditions, are grouped into four categories: (1) U.S. 
financial market, (2) global risk premiums, (3) global investment flows, and (4) CDS 
rates of other sovereigns. Three main findings arise from the analysis.  
 
[15] See Korinek, Roitman, and Végh (2010) 







Source: Bloomberg and Markit. 
Figure 2.1: Average Sovereign CDS Rate in EMs and U.S. Stock Market Index 
 
First, the level of commonality in EMs’ sovereign CDS rates increased during 
the GFC period. Subsequently, it remained at a level higher than that observed during 
the pre-crisis period, indicating that the common influences that drove EMs’ sovereign 
CDS rates during the period of turmoil time were still at work even after the GFC 
ended. The first principal component explains 34 percent of the variation in sovereign 
CDS rates in the pre-crisis period. This share rises to 60 percent during the GFC period 
and stays as high as 48 percent in the post-crisis period. Second, regression analysis 
shows that the local stock market return and exchange rate against the U.S. dollar have 





three sub-periods. Third, all four categories of global variables significantly drive EMs’ 
sovereign CDS rates during the GFC period and continue to play an essential role in 
the post-crisis period. However, the impact of variables within each category varies 
over time. This finding supports the existence of spillovers from developments in 
global and particularly U.S. financial markets to the funding costs of EM sovereign 
borrowers. 
The paper has several implications for both policymakers and global investors. 
First, my finding that the local factors have a significant impact on that country’s 
sovereign credit risk in both normal and turmoil times suggests that, in terms of 
sovereign risk management, country authorities should always keep an eye on own 
country fundamentals. Second, global conditions in the post-crisis period are more 
important for EMs than in the pre-crisis period. Accounting for global factors, 
especially U.S. stock and bond market conditions, may have significant consequences 
for the design of monetary policy and monitoring of the sovereign credit risk in EMs. 
Third, I find that capital flows from global equity and bond funds fostered financial 
recoupling of EMs in the post-crisis period. The finding implies that such financial 
integration may strengthen the influence of shifts in the risk appetite and liquidity 
preferences of global investors who are prone to cross-market arbitrage and hedging. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a 
brief review of the literature. Section 2.3 describes the sovereign CDS data and the 
explanatory variables included in the regression analysis. Section 2.4 explores the 





describes the econometric methodology, discusses the main results, and reports 
robustness tests. Section 2.6 offers some concluding remarks.  
2.2 Related Literature 
This paper is mainly related to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the 
understanding of sovereign CDS pricing. Many studies have documented important 
determinants of sovereign credit risk. For example, Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and 
Singleton (2011) find that the majority of sovereign credit risk in 26 EM and advanced 
economies can be linked to global factors, especially to conditions in U.S. stock and 
high-yield markets. Dieckmann and Plank (2012) document that the state of a country’s 
financial system and the global financial system have powerful explanatory power for 
the behavior of sovereign CDS spreads. Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013) 
demonstrate that fiscal space and other macroeconomic factors are statistically and 
economically significant determinants of sovereign risk for Eurozone Periphery 
countries. Fender, Hayo, and Neuenkirch (2012) use a GARCH framework to show 
that sovereign CDS spreads of 12 EMs are more related to global and regional risk 
premia than to country-specific risk factors, especially during the GFC. Fabozzi, 
Giacometti, and Tsuchida (2016) identify three factors that impact weekly sovereign 
CDS spreads of 7 Eurozone countries: a peripheral factor, a global factor, and a 
Eurozone common factor. They show that the source of volatility for CDS spreads 
shifted from the global factor in 2009 and the peripheral factor in 2010 to the Eurozone 
common factor in 2012. Du and Schreger (2017) show that a higher reliance on external 
foreign currency corporate financing leads to a higher probability of sovereign default 





 Within this strand of literature, my study is most closely related to Longstaff et 
al. (2011) and Fender, Hayo, and Neuenkirch (2012). This paper takes Longstaff et al. 
(2011) as a starting point, but my methodology differs from theirs in several ways. 
First, Longstaff et al. (2011) use end-month data on sovereign CDS contracts. 
However, data at lower frequency tend to show higher correlations and lead to 
estimation bias. My study mitigates this issue by utilizing daily sovereign CDS data. 
Second, I run regressions both for the whole sample period and for three sub-periods: 
before, during, and after the GFC. This enables me to examine time-varying effects of 
explanatory variables on sovereign CDS rates. Third, in addition to the variables 
incorporated in Longstaff et al. (2011), I add several other variables that have been 
demonstrated to be significant drivers of sovereign CDS rates. Fourth, I use a panel-
regression framework and provide point estimates of standardized beta coefficients 
instead of only reporting t-statistics at the country level, as Longstaff et al. (2011) do. 
Standardized beta coefficients show the standard-deviation change in the dependent 
variable resulting from a one-standard-deviation change in an independent variable. 
This makes results comparable across different independent variables and across three 
sub-periods.  
My paper also extends the work of Fender et al. (2012) in two ways. First, I 
include a much broader set of variables at a daily frequency than what Fender et al. 
(2012) cover in their study. Second, I examine a larger sample of EMs (17 versus 12 
countries) for a more extended period (July 2004- December 2017 versus April 2002 - 
December 2011). This allows me to examine more systematically the impact of local 





but also in the post-crisis period. This expanded data coverage provides a better 
understanding of market dynamics around the crisis period. 
 Second, this paper adds to the literature on the “decoupling-recoupling 
hypothesis” by providing evidence from the perspective of sovereign CDS rates. The 
hypothesis states that from early 2007 to mid-2008, EMs seemed to be isolated from 
the financial problems originating in the U.S., as a sign of their economic maturity 
(“decoupling”). However, after mid-2008, especially after the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, the crisis began to affect countries all around the world, 
with no exception for EMs (“recoupling”). Korinek, Roitman, and Végh (2010) 
develop a stylized model that captures these observed phenomena. Dooley and 
Hutchison (2009) use a regression “event study” approach to show that starting in 
summer 2008, financial and real economic news shocks emanating from the U.S. began 
to have significant impacts on sovereign CDS rates of 14 EMs. Felices and Wieladek 
(2012) examine two vulnerability indicators of financial crises (real exchange rate 
appreciation and international reserve growth) in 41 sample countries and find that, 
before the onset of the subprime crisis, there was little evidence of decoupling for most 
countries. However, some countries did show a gradual and persistent decline in their 
exposure to global factors. Yeyati and Williams (2012) document that EMs reduced 
their business cycle co-movements with the advanced economies in the 2000s, while 
on the financial front, the co-movement between EM and global asset prices rose 
steadily in the late 2000s, even before the GFC.  
My paper suggests that, prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was 





financial market, including the stock market return, Treasury yields, and perceived 
volatility in the bond market. After September 2008, however, EM’s sovereign CDS 
rates begin to be affected by a broader range of global factors, and this impact persisted 
after the GFC ended. This finding lends support to the “recoupling” part of the 
hypothesis.  
2.3 Data 
The sample covers dates from 07/01/2004 to 12/31/2017 and has a total of 59,549 daily 
observations. To compare the influence of global and local variables during pre-crisis, 
crisis, and post-crisis periods, I split the sample into three parts: the pre-crisis 
subsample (07/01/2004 - 08/08/2007), this crisis subsample (08/09/2007 - 06/30/2009), 
and the post-crisis subsample (07/01/2009 - 12/31/2017).[17] The data set used in this 
study is described in more detail below. 
2.3.1 Creating A Sample of EM Sovereign CDS Rates 
I obtain daily pricing data for sovereign CDS from the Markit database. Markit is one 
of the most widely employed CDS databases in finance and economics literature. 
Papers that employ this dataset include Acharya and Johnson (2007), Jorion and Zhang 
(2007), Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009), and Hébert and Schreger (2017). Markit collects 
more than a million CDS quotes contributed by more than 30 major market participants 
on a daily basis and provides end-of-day (i.e., 4pm EDT) CDS single name composites 
on approximately 2,600 entities. The quotes are subject to a curve-based cleaning 
 
[17] I also consider several other split points in the data to examine pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 





process that removes outliers and stale observations. Markit then computes a daily 
composite spread as long as it has two or more contributors. I focus on the available 
universe of sovereign 5-year CDS markets since the 5-year maturity is the most liquid 
type traded in CDS markets. These CDS are all denominated in U.S. dollars, which 
eliminates confounding pricing effects from exchange rates on CDS rates. 
 I apply several filters to the CDS data to mitigate bias from missing or stale 
data, following the existing literature (Bedendo and Colla, 2015; Berndt and Obreja, 
2010; Schneider, Sögner, and Veža, 2010). First, I exclude CDS for which the most 
extended series of consecutive missing rates covers more than two weeks. Second, I 
exclude CDS for which the percentage of missing data exceeds 15% of the whole 
period. Third, I exclude stale observations with zero changes in sovereign CDS rates. 
Finally, to reduce the effect of possibly spurious outliers, I winsorize the sovereign 
CDS rates for each country at the 1% and 99% levels. This methodology results in a 
sample of 17 EMs covered by the MSCI Emerging Markets Index: Brazil, Chile, China, 
Czech Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea (Republic of), Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. All countries are 
included in the sample for the full period. These 17 EMs are covered in the Markit 
database throughout the whole period, so there is no entry/exit effect. 
 Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for daily changes in sovereign CDS 
rates for the whole sample and by each country. All rates are denominated in basis 
points. The numbers show that there are significant cross-country and time-series 





Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Daily Changes in Sovereign CDS Rates 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Whole Sample 59549 -0.046 6.171 -64.48 -0.005 65.48 0.370 32.58 
Brazil 3503 -0.162 8.024 -56.96 -0.165 59.45 0.411 15.03 
Chile 3503 0.001 2.773 -10.09 0.000 11.03 0.245 7.780 
China 3503 -0.008 2.662 -8.277 -0.030 9.698 0.381 6.382 
Czech Republic 3503 -0.003 2.174 -0.847 0.000 9.129 0.359 10.88 
Egypt 3503 -0.002 5.931 -26.17 0.000 27.26 0.037 10.17 
Indonesia 3503 -0.204 6.671 -24.76 -0.222 26.00 0.075 7.611 
Korea (Rep. of) 3503 -0.013 3.796 -14.22 -0.062 15.86 0.392 9.731 
Malaysia 3503 -0.012 3.630 -12.08 -0.048 13.10 0.267 6.796 
Mexico 3503 -0.030 4.738 -17.62 -0.068 19.50 0.282 8.076 
Pakistan 3503 0.174 14.47 -64.48 0.000 65.84 0.277 14.40 
Peru 3503 -0.111 5.578 -21.67 -0.190 26.80 0.598 9.270 
Philippines 3503 -0.143 5.433 -19.41 -0.164 19.73 0.131 6.839 
Qatar 3503 -0.008 2.185 -8.238 0.000 8.786 0.338 8.981 
Russia 3503 -0.148 7.792 -29.29 -0.076 27.47 -0.160 7.053 
South Africa 3503 -0.019 5.382 -17.33 -0.058 18.77 0.172 6.012 
Thailand 3503 0.004 3.326 -11.00 -0.044 11.91 0.311 6.783 
Turkey 3503 -0.093 7.638 -30.82 -0.213 34.53 0.358 7.644 
Note: Sovereign CDS data cover dates from 7/1/2004 to 12/31/2017. CDS rates are measured 
in basis points. 
Source: Markit and the author’s calculation.  
 
2.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
My analysis incorporates a relatively comprehensive list of both local and global 
variables, as documented by the literature, that have the potential to explain movements 





2.3.2.1 Local Variables 
The possibility of sovereign defaults which sovereign CDS contracts aim to insure 
against, is closely associated with the state of the local economy. The less favorable the 
domestic economy is, the harder it is for the country to maintain debt service in the face 
of adverse shocks, and consequently, the higher the possibility of a sovereign default. 
Tomz and Wright (2007) document such a negative relationship between economic 
output in the borrowing country and default on loans from private foreign creditors for 
the period 1820-2004. 
 To capture information about the local economy, I include several financial and 
macroeconomic variables in this study. Details about each variable’s definition, 
frequency, and source of data are described in Table B.2 in the Appendix, and similarly 
for all other explanatory variables. 
 Local Stock Market Returns, calculated as the daily percentage change in the 
adjusted closing price of a country’s major stock market index. It serves as an indicator 
for overall consumer and business confidence about the performance of a mix of local 
companies.[18] 
 Exchange Rates, measured as the daily percentage change in the units of the 
local currency per U.S. dollar, reflect a country’s economic activity, growth prospects, 
 
[18] The major stock market index for each country used in this study is Ibovespa Brasil Sao Paulo Stock 
Exchange Index (Brazil), Santiago Stock Exchange General Index (Chile), Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index (China), Prague Stock Exchange Index (Czech Republic), Egyptian Exchange EGX 30 
Price Index (Egypt), Jakarta Composite Index (Indonesia), KOSI Composite Index (Korea), FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia KLCI Index (Malaysia), IPC Index (Mexico), Karachi Stock Exchange Index (Pakistan), BVL 
General Index (Peru), PSEi Index (Philippines), Qatar Exchange Index (Qatar), MOEX Russia Index 
(Russia), FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index (South Africa), Stock Exchange of Thailand SET Index 





and geopolitical risk. The stronger the economy, the higher demand for the local 
currency in the global market. 
 Foreign Currency Reserves measures the monthly percentage change in the 
dollar value of a country’s holdings of foreign reserves. This variable captures the 
country’s capacity to service foreign-currency-denominated debt. Foreign currency 
reserves help reduce the likelihood of sovereign debt crises and improve a country’s 
access to debt markets, as shown by Hernandez (2017). 
2.3.2.2 Global Financial Variables 
Following Longstaff et al. (2011), I also include four categories of global financial 
variables that reflect the state of the global economy. The literature has extensively 
documented that EMs’ business cycles, and consequently their ability to repay 
sovereign debt, are affected by global business cycles. Deepened trade and financial-
market integration elevate spillovers of macroeconomic fluctuations across countries 
(Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2003; Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005; Kose, Prasad, 
Rogoff, and Wei, 2009). 
 The first category measures conditions in the U.S. financial market. As the 
world’s largest economy, shocks to U.S. financial markets are spread globally and have 
a direct/indirect impact on the local economy and financial markets of my sample 
countries. For the U.S. equity market, I include the U.S. Stock Market Excess Return, 
which is the daily change in the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks, minus the one-month Treasury-bill return. This variable measures 
the overall performance of the U.S. equity market over and above the return on a risk-





variations in U.S. bonds’ flight-to-quality element, which may also drive EMs’ 
sovereign credit rates: (1) Treasury Yields, which is the daily change in the five-year 
constant maturity Treasury yield; (2) U.S. Yield Curve Slope, which is the daily change 
in the difference between the 10-year Treasury bond rate and the 3-month Treasury bill 
rate; (3) MOVE Volatility Index, which is the daily change in a yield-curve-weighted 
index of the volatility on 1-month Treasury options, capturing risk preferences in fixed 
income markets; (4) Investment-Grade Spread, which is the daily change in the basis-
point yield spread between BBB and AAA industrial bond indexes, reflecting 
variations in investment-grade bond yields; and (5) High-Yield Spread, which is the 
daily changes in the basis-point yield spread between BB and BBB industrial bond 
indexes, reflecting variations in high-yield bond yields. 
 The second category measures the global risk premiums. I include three 
measures of risk premiums in the study: (1) Equity Premium, which is the daily change 
in the price-earnings ratio for the S&P 100 index, reflecting whether stock prices are 
generally overvalued or undervalued relative to earnings; (2) Volatility Premium, 
which is the daily change in the difference between the VIX index and Garman-Klass 
measure of realized volatility for the S&P 100 index, reflecting the difference between 
the stock market’s expected and realized volatility; and (3) Term Premium, which is 
the expected excess return of five-year U.S. Treasury bonds, calculated using Fama-
Bliss bond data and the model estimates presented in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). 
 The third category measures the global investment flows. As mentioned by 
Longstaff et al. (2011), herding and speculative behavior of investment flows affect the 





Equity Flows and Global Bond Flows these two variables, which are defined as the 
monthly changes in the net new flows (inflow minus outflow) into all mutual funds 
worldwide investing primarily in equity and bonds, respectively. 
 The last category measures CDS rates of other sovereigns. To control for any 
other external influences on a country’s sovereign CDS rates, I also include two 
measures of the changes in CDS rates of other sovereigns in the universe of the Markit 
CDS database. Countries with qualified CDS data are divided into six regions: Africa, 
Asia Pacific, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and North America. The first 
measure, Global Sovereign CDS rates, is computed as the daily change in the average 
of CDS rates for all of countries outside that country’s region. The second measure, 
Regional Sovereign CDS rates, is computed as the daily change in the average of CDS 
rates for all other countries in that country’s region. Table 2.2 presents descriptive 
statistics for all explanatory variables.  
2.4 Principal Component Analysis 
In this section, I use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to explore the variation in 
EMs’ sovereign CDS rates, focusing on the differences across three sub-periods: 
before, during, and after the GFC. 
 I first compute the correlation matrix of daily sovereign CDS rate changes. 
Table B.3 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of daily changes in the sovereign 
CDS rate for the sample countries. All of the pairwise correlations are positive, and the 
correlations of sovereign CDS rates within the same region tend to be high. For 





between the Philippines and Indonesia is 81 percent. Similar correlation matrices are 
computed for each of the three sub-periods as well. 
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Local Variables         
Local Stock Market 
Return 
57672 0.000 0.019 -0.217 -0.000 0.275 0.554 15.96 
Exchange Rate 59549 0.000 0.007 -0.142 0.000 0.361 3.360 181.8 
Foreign Currency 
Reserve 
59549 0.006 0.040 -0.417 0.006 0.341 -0.748 22.18 
U.S. Financial 
Market 
        
U.S. Stock Market 
Excess Return 
57118 -0.000 0.017 -0.122 -0.001 0.131 0.577 13.86 
Treasury Yields 57101 -0.000 0.058 -0.460 0.000 0.340 -0.125 7.031 
U.S. Yield Curve 
Slope 
57033 -0.001 0.070 -0.520 -0.000 0.740 0.326 16.01 
MOVE Volatility 
Index 
59549 -0.001 0.040 -0.426 -0.002 0.286 -0.096 11.46 
Investment-Grade 
Spread 
58869 -0.000 0.049 -1.520 -0.000 1.530 0.385 552.9 
High-Yield Spread 58869 -0.000 0.066 -0.570 -0.000 0.600 0.538 14.59 
Global Risk 
Premiums 
        
Equity Premium 59549 0.001 0.206 -5.030 0.005 2.091 -3.965 115.5 
Volatility Premium 57543 -0.000 1.782 -17.51 -0.054 16.46 0.102 22.01 
Term Premium 59549 0.000 0.005 -0.023 0.000 0.018 0.648 7.816 
Global Investment 
Flows 
        
Global Equity Flow 59549 0.522 5.996 -14.88 0.143 64.42 7.692 85.63 
Global Bond Flow 59549 -0.783 3.856 -24.05 -0.027 2.896 -5.031 28.77 
CDS Rates of Other 
Sovereigns 
        
Global Sovereign CDS 
Rate 
59549 -0.005 7.034 -39.61 -0.137 42.20 0.444 15.98 
Regional Sovereign 
CDS Rate 
59549 -0.022 6.771 -68.88 -0.094 75.04 0.474 52.12 
Note: data cover dates from 7/1/2004 to 12/31/2017. 






For comparison, I also calculate the correlation matrix between local stock 
returns for the same sample of countries. The correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table B.4. Compared to correlations for sovereign CDS rate changes, those for stock 
returns tend to be much smaller. This indicates that sovereign CDS rates may be more 
“global” and less “local” than stock market returns. 
I then use these matrices to estimate the principal components for both daily 
sovereign CDS rate changes and local stock market returns. The fraction of variation 
captured by each of the first five principal components is presented in Table 2.3, for 
the entire sample period as well as three sub-periods. 
 
Table 2.3: Principal Components Analysis Results 










explained Total  
Panel A 
CDS changes 
        
First 50.78 50.78 34.41 34.41 59.66 59.66 48.15 48.15 
Second 13.15 64.93 12.31 46.71 10.62 70.28 16.26 64.41 
Third  6.16 70.09 6.71 53.42 5.99 76.27 6.46 70.87 
Fourth 5.79 75.89 6.12 59.55 5.69 81.96 5.83 76.70 
Fifth 4.46 80.35 5.48 65.02 4.08 86.04 4.66 81.36 
Panel B  
Stock returns 
        
First 33.95 33.95 27.83 27.83 40.98 40.98 31.71 31.71 
Second 10.52 44.46 10.76 38.58 10.77 51.75 11.08 42.79 
Third  6.74 51.20 7.32 45.91 7.19 58.95 6.49 49.28 
Fourth 5.91 57.11 6.73 52.64 6.08 65.02 6.08 55.36 
Fifth 5.62 62.73 6.06 58.70 5.40 70.42 5.45 60.81 
Note: the results are calculated using the correlation matrix of daily sovereign CDS spread 
changes and the correlation matrix of local stock market returns, which are presented in Table 
B.3 and Table B.4. The full sample period covers dates from 7/1/2004 to 12/31/2017. Pre-, 








Panel A of Table 2.3 shows that, during the full sample period, the first principal 
component (PC) explains around 50 percent of the variation in EM’s sovereign CDS 
rates, suggesting a considerable amount of commonality in those sovereign CDS rates. 
The first five PCs explain more than 80 percent of the variation. Looking at the results 
for the three sub-periods, one can find that the first PC explains about 60 percent of the 
sovereign CDS rate fluctuations during the crisis period, higher than the share during 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis sub-periods. This indicates a more substantial 
commonality in the behavior of EM’s sovereign CDS rates during the period of 
financial turmoil, which could be due to one or several shared influences. Interestingly, 
the share of variation accounted for by the first PC for the post-crisis sub-period is still 
considerably higher than that for the pre-crisis sub-period (48% versus 34%). This 
implies that those shared influences that drove the commonality of EMs sovereign CDS 
rates during the crisis may still have been at work after the GFC ended. 
In contrast, the PCA of local stock market returns shows less commonality for 
the same group of sample countries (see Panel B of Table 2.3). Over the entire sample 
period, the first component explains around only 34 percent of the variation in EM’s 
stock market returns, as compared to 51 percent in sovereign CDS rate changes. Similar 
patterns are found for all three sub-periods. 
This study is the first to show the degree of commonality in the behavior of 
EM’s sovereign CDS rate changes and local stock market returns using PCA during 
the post-crisis period. As for the pre- and during- crisis periods, the results are in line 
with previous studies in the literature. For example, Fender, Hayo, and Neuenkirch 





stock market returns. Also, the percentage of variation explained by the first principal 
component rises substantially during the GFC period (August 2007- December 2011 
by their definition). Longstaff et al. (2011) also find similar patterns using monthly 
CDS quotes on 26 EMs and advanced economies: the first principal component 
accounts for about 43% (2000-2006) and 75% (2007-2010) of the variation in 
sovereign CDS rate changes. These numbers are slightly higher than the ones in both 
my study and Fender, Hayo, and Neuenkirch (2012), which may suggest that common 
factors are of less significance at a higher daily frequency than monthly frequency. 
2.5 Regression Analysis 
In this section, I further investigate the sources of commonality of EMs’ sovereign CDS 
rate changes discovered in the PCA. Specifically, I study how the set of local and global 
drivers described in Section 2.3.2 explain the behavior of EMs’ sovereign CDS rate 
changes before, during, and after the GFC. 
2.5.1 Methodology 
I formally examine how sovereign CDS rates respond to changes in local and global 
variables at a daily frequency in my sample panel of 17 EM countries, using the 
following regression: 
∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽(𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾(𝑮𝑮𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑮𝑮𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳)𝑗𝑗 
                                                +𝜅𝜅(𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗 
              +𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
 
Equation 9 
where i and t denote sovereign and time on a daily basis, respectively. 





(𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳)𝑖𝑖 is a set of local macroeconomic and financial variables at the country level. It 
includes (i) daily changes in local stock market returns; (ii) daily percentage changes 
in the exchange rate of the local currency against the U.S. dollar; and (iii) monthly 
percentage changes in that country’s foreign currency reserves denominated in U.S. 
dollars.[19] [20] 𝑮𝑮𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑮𝑮𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 is the daily change in a common set of global financial variables. 
It includes: (i) a list of indicators on U.S. financial markets; (ii) global risk premiums; 
(iii) global investment flows; (iv) CDS rates of other sovereigns.[21] 
 I also include “day of the week effects” in the regression to control for the 
possible nonconstant distributions of financial asset returns across days of the week, an 
anomaly well documented by the finance literature.[22] The variable consists of a set of 
step dummies created for each weekday of the week. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗  capture country and 
monthly time fixed effects, respectively. 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is a stochastic error term that captures the 
effects of other factors that influence the sovereign CDS rate. I correct all standard 
errors for possible heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation by adopting Newey-West 
variance estimates.[23] 
2.5.2 Discussion of Results 
I regress daily changes in sovereign CDS rates on the explanatory variables described 
in Equation 9 above for the pool of 17 EMs in my sample. Table 2.4 reports the results 
for the entire sample in Column (1) and for pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis sub-
 
[19] Details about each explanatory variable’s definition, frequency, and source of the data are described 
in Table B.2 in the Appendix. 
[20] Variable of foreign currency reserves enters Equation 9 as a monthly measure. 
[21] Variables of term premium and global investment flows enter Equation 9 as monthly measures. 
[22] See, for example, Fields (1931), Gibbons and Hess (1981), Aggarwal and Rivoli (1989), and 
Basher and Sadorsky (2006). 





samples in Columns (2), (3), and (4), respectively. I use the event of BNP Paribas, 
France’s largest bank, halting redemptions on three hedge funds that specialized in U.S. 
mortgage debt on August 9, 2007, as the start of the GFC. I use June 30, 2009 as the 
ending of the GFC. This date is marked by NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee 
as the end of the recession and the return to economic growth in the U.S. [24] 
Table 2.4: Local and Global Drivers of Changes in Sovereign CDS Rates 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local Variables     
Local stock market return -0.147*** -0.062*** -0.178*** -0.168*** 
 (-22.45) (-8.19) (-13.84) (-18.12) 
Exchange rate 0.266*** 0.213*** 0.272*** 0.264*** 
 (13.39) (12.57) (10.83) (8.67) 
Currency reserve -0.006 0.022* -0.020 -0.005 
 (-0.90) (1.79) (-1.24) (-0.70) 
     
U.S. Financial Market     
Stock market excess return -0.042*** 0.007 -0.061*** -0.042*** 
 (-4.61) (0.51) (-3.01) (-4.80) 
Treasury yields -0.002 0.020 -0.021 0.053*** 
 (-0.17) (1.54) (-1.13) (4.10) 
U.S. yield curve slope 0.012 0.003 0.004 -0.032** 
 (1.11) (0.24) (0.31) (-2.41) 
MOVE volatility index 0.009* 0.006 0.043*** -0.000 
 (1.86) (1.04) (2.64) (-0.01) 
Investment-grade spread 0.005 0.122*** 0.003 0.006 
 (0.88) (5.47) (0.38) (0.67) 
High-yield spread 0.028*** 0.050*** -0.034 0.050*** 
 (2.93) (3.88) (-1.6) (5.53) 
     
Global Risk Premiums     
Equity premium -0.055*** -0.041*** -0.050* -0.041*** 
 (-5.72) (-2.92) (-1.90) (-4.41) 
Volatility premium 0.074*** 0.137*** 0.057* 0.067*** 
 (6.58) (7.12) (1.96) (7.56) 
Term premium -0.013* 0.013 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.68) (1.08) (-0.26) (-0.73) 
 
 





Table 2.4: Local and Global Drivers of Changes in Sovereign CDS Rates (Continued) 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Global Investment Flows     
Equity flow -0.006* 0.011 -0.007 -0.007** 
 (-1.81) (1.21) (-0.20) (-1.83) 
Bond flow 0.020*** -0.047 0.131 0.014*** 
 (5.34) (-1.58) (1.53) (3.69) 
     
Sovereign CDS Rates     
Global CDS rate 0.054*** 0.106*** 0.150*** 0.025*** 
 (8.49) (4.17) (4.72) (6.54) 
Regional CDS rate 0.033*** 0.047*** 0.047** 0.016*** 
 (5.62) (3.19) (2.57) (2.82) 
     
Day of The Week Effects     
Monday 0.008 0.033** 0.050 -0.010 
 (0.66) (2.24) (1.01) (-0.75) 
Tuesday -0.029** -0.019 0.039 -0.052*** 
 (-2.29) (-1.25) (0.73) (-3.72) 
Wednesday -0.001 -0.008 0.161*** -0.032** 
 (-0.06) (-0.48) (2.94) (-2.46) 
Thursday -0.003 -0.017 0.073 -0.015 
 (-0.22) (-1.09) (1.53) (-1.07) 
Observations 57,672 13,400 8,103 36,169 
Note: Dummy for Friday was omitted from regressions because of collinearity; therefore, its results are 
not reported. Beta coefficients are reported. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
“Newey-West” heteroskedastic- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
2.5.2.1 Local Variables 
Let us first focus on the three local variables. Table 2.4 shows strong evidence that 
local stock market returns and exchange rates exert a significant impact (at the one-
percent level) on EMs’ sovereign CDS rates before, during, and after the GFC. The 
negative coefficients on local stock market returns indicate that an increase in closing 
stock prices, an indicator for better expectations about future economic activity, lowers 
sovereign CDS rates. The positive coefficients on exchange rates indicate that an 





dollar-denominated sovereign debt considerably more expensive, thus elevating that 
EM’s sovereign risk. 
 The coefficient on foreign currency reserves is weakly positive before the GFC 
and not statistically significant afterward. One reason could be that the impact of 
foreign currency reserves has already been priced into the exchange rate, a more 
market-oriented measure. A higher level of foreign currency reserves provides 
confidence among investors and better supports the currency from any sudden shocks. 
Among these three local drivers, the exchange rate has the most influential 
impact on the pricing of sovereign CDS. For every one-standard deviation increase in 
the exchange rate, the country’s sovereign CDS rate rises by more than 0.2 standard 
deviations for all three sub-periods. 
2.5.2.2 Global Financial Variables 
Now let us turn to the global variables. First, the regression results indicate that the 
impact of U.S. financial market variables on EMs’ sovereign CDS rates changes over 
the three sub-periods. Before the GFC, neither the state of the U.S. stock market nor 
the Treasury fixed-income market (proxied by Treasury yields, the slope of U.S. yield 
curve, and the MOVE volatility index) have a significant influence on EMs’ sovereign 
CDS rates. 
 With the onset of the GFC, however, U.S. stock market performance became 
vital in explaining variation in EMs’ sovereign CDS rates. The negative coefficients in 
columns (3) and (4) indicate that bad news for the U.S. stock market is also bad news 
for EMs’ sovereign CDS rates. Also, I find that U.S. Treasury yields and the slope of 





from US monetary policy on EMs sovereign risk. The positive sign of U.S. Treasury 
yields indicates that higher returns on U.S. Treasury bonds lead to an increase in EMs’ 
sovereign CDS rates, perhaps suggesting that the sovereign bonds of U.S. and EMs are 
considered as substitutes in investor portfolios after the GFC. The negative coefficient 
on the slope of U.S. yield curve could be explained by the phenomenon that an 
“inversion” of the yield curve, in which short-maturity interest rates are higher than 
long-maturity rates, is typically associated with an imminent recession; and a recession 
in the U.S. could be transmitted to EMs, thus elevating their sovereign credit risk. 
 Moreover, the sentiment of the U.S. bond market, as measured by the MOVE 
volatility index, significantly affects EMs’ sovereign credit conditions during the 
turbulent crisis period. The positive coefficient indicates that rising concerns within the 
U.S. bond market elevate the sovereign CDS rates in EMs. Once the GFC ends, 
volatility in the U.S. bond market no longer has a significant impact on EMs’ sovereign 
CDS rates. 
 My findings above support the “decoupling-recoupling hypothesis” on the 
transmission of the GFC to EMs. The hypothesis states that EMs were insulated from 
developments in U.S. financial markets prior to the GFC; with the beginning of the 
GFC, however, EMs responded strongly to the worsening situation in the U.S. financial 
system. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) also find similar evidence in support of this 
hypothesis using an “event study” method. 
 U.S. corporate bond market conditions, as gauged by the investment-grade 
spread and high-yield spread, have a significantly positive impact on EM’s sovereign 





yields, the positive coefficients on these two corporate bond market indicators imply 
that before the GFC, sovereign debt of EMs and U.S. corporate bonds were considered 
as substitutes in investor portfolios. During the GFC, this impact is not significant. One 
reason could be that U.S. equity market conditions became a more dominant influence 
on EMs’ sovereign credit risk than U.S. corporate bond market conditions during the 
crisis period. In the post-crisis period, the high-yield spread again becomes a significant 
driver of EMs’ sovereign CDS rates, but not the investment-grade spread. 
Overall, among all indicators of U.S. Financial Market, the leading driver on 
the pricing of EMs’ sovereign CDS rates changes from the investment-grade spread in 
the pre-crisis period, to stock market excess returns in the crisis period, to Treasury 
yields in the post-crisis period. The results highlight the role of the U.S. stock market 
in EMs’ sovereign credit risk during turbulent times and the role of the Fed’s monetary 
policies, e.g. quantitative easing, after the GFC. 
 Next, the regression results suggest a strong relationship between global risk 
premiums and EMs’ sovereign CDS rates before, during, and after the GFC. The 
significant negative coefficients on the equity premium variable indicate that a drop in 
the price-earnings ratio for the S&P 100 stock market index, which includes the largest 
and most established companies in the S&P 500, leads to an increase in EMs’ sovereign 
CDS rates. The significant positive coefficients on the volatility premium variable 
indicate that an upswing in the difference between perceived and realized volatility of 
the U.S. stock market contributes to a rise in EMs’ sovereign CDS rates. The 





these three risk premiums, the volatility premium is the most influential for EMs’ 
sovereign CDS rates. 
 Thirdly, two measures of global investment flows significantly influence EMs’ 
sovereign CDS rates, although only in the post-crisis period. One explanation for the 
negative coefficient on global equity flows could be that after the GFC, a decline in the 
market liquidity of equities (caused, for example, by funding shocks to leveraged 
investors) leads to an increase in EMs’ sovereign CDS rates. Longstaff et al. (2011) 
suggest that this phenomenon could be explained if the marginal investor subject to 
these funding shocks holds sovereign debt, so that sovereign CDS rates might display 
a shared liquidity related pattern. On the contrary, global bond inflows push up 
sovereign CDS rates in EMs, which is consistent with the view that when there is a 
switch away from risk in market sentiment, investors turn away from EMs’ sovereign 
debt, which is usually considered as a risky asset. The finance literature has 
acknowledged the role of international mutual funds in transmitting financial shocks in 
equity and bond markets. For example, Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) argue that 
mutual funds may trigger asset fire sales during downturns, thus exacerbating the global 
financial cycle. My finding suggests that this transmission may have a delayed effect 
on EM’s sovereign CDS rates. 
 Finally, CDS rates of other sovereigns always have a significantly positive 
impact on an EM’s sovereign CDS rates, after controlling for local and common global 
factors. Not surprisingly, both the global CDS rate, defined as the average CDS rate for 
all countries outside one’s own region, and the regional CDS rate, defined as the 





sovereign CDS rate in the same direction. These measures of average sovereign CDS 
rates could reflect some common factor(s) that are not captured by other explanatory 
variables, as suggested by Longstaff et al. (2011). 
2.5.3 Decomposition of R-square 
In addition to the estimated coefficients on local and global factors, I would also like 
to determine what share of the residual variance of sovereign CDS rates (after taking 
out any country and time fixed effects) can be accounted for by the local and different 
types of global factors. One way to do this is to decompose R-square using the Shapley-
Owen Decomposition. Table 2.5 reports the percentage points each group of factors’ 
contributions for three sub-periods. Local Variables remains the major contributor to 
the model variance in the full sample and the number rose noticeably in the post-crisis 
period. In contrast, the variance contributions of U.S. Financial Market and Sovereign 
CDS Rates rose during the crisis period and fell back after the crisis ended.  
 
Table 2.5: R-square Decomposition of Regressors (in percentage points) 
Groups of Regressors Full Sample Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
Local Variables 71.7 54.0 53.8 79.5 
U.S. Financial Market 8.9 10.4 11.7 6.6 
Global Risk Premiums 12.1 14.9 13.5 7.9 
Global Investment Flows 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 






2.5.4 Robustness Tests 
In this subsection, I demonstrate that my results on the impact of local and global 
variables on EMs’ sovereign CDS rates are robust against different cutoffs of pre-crisis, 
crisis, and post-crisis sub-periods. 
 For the main results, I use August 9, 2007 as the starting point of the crisis. This 
is the date when BNP Paribas, France’s largest bank, halted redemptions on three 
investment funds. Here I test two additional starting dates while keeping the ending 
date as June 30, 2009. One alternative date is February 27, 2007, when Freddie Mac 
announced that it would no longer buy the riskiest subprime mortgages and mortgage-
related securities. At that point, the GFC was mostly concentrated within the subprime 
mortgage sector in the U.S. The other alternative date is September 15, 2008, when 
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy. Lehman Brothers’ failure seemed to trigger a 
more widespread financial crisis and a subsequent recession, both within and beyond 
the U.S. Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 report regression results using February 27, 2007 and 
September 15, 2008 as the starting point of the GFC, respectively. The results in 
Column (2) and (3) are both quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the main results 
reported in Table 2.4. 
 Similarly, I also check two alternative ending dates while keeping the starting 
date as August 9, 2007. One alternative date is March 6, 2009, when the Dow Jones 
industrial average (DJIA) hit its GFC low of 6,469.95. After this date, the DJIA 
rebounded and made its way back above 10,000 by mid-2010. This date was thus the 
turning point of the GFC for financial markets and was three months prior to the official 





Table 2.8 reports the results. First, the coefficients for the MOVE volatility 
index and regional CDS rates are not significant anymore, compared with those 
reported in Table 2.4. One explanation could be that the strong positive impact of these 
two variables on EMs’ sovereign CDS rates were concentrated in the later phase of the 
GFC, which is included in the crisis period defined in Table 2.4, but not in Table 2.8. 
Secondly, the coefficient for the term-premium variable becomes significantly negative 
in the post-crisis period. The term premium is the excess yield that investors requires 
as compensation for holding a long-term Treasury bond rather than holding a series of 
shorter-term bonds. The negative relationship means that when the excess yield rises, 
EMs’ sovereign CDS rates fall. One explanation is that, between March and July 2009, 
the Federal Reserve made a series of announcements to inject liquidity into the market 
and maintain the effective federal funds rate at 0 to 0.25 percent for an extended period. 
In the foreseeable low-interest-rate environment, investors were more willing to roll 
over their investments in a series of shorter-term bonds, thus requiring an extra yield to 
induce them to hold a bond for a more extended period. The term premium rises during 
this time. As a substitute for U.S. Treasury long-term bonds, EM 5-year sovereign 
bonds became a more desirable asset with higher returns. Therefore, investors required 
less compensation for default risk to hold the EM sovereign bonds, and CDS rates fell 
as a result. 
 The second alternative ending date is January 31, 2010, which is the end of the 
sample period used in Longstaff et al. (2011). Table 2.9 reports the results. They are 
quantitatively and qualitatively very similar to those in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 





regression results in Table 3 of Longstaff et al. (2011), since they cover about the same 
sample period. Longstaff et al. (2011) find that the U.S. stock market return and the 
U.S. high-yield spread are the most influential financial market variables. However, 
when I break the period into two parts, before and during the GFC, a different picture 
reveals itself. The U.S. stock market only has a significant impact on EMs’ sovereign 
CDS rates during the GFC, not before the GFC, and the U.S. high-yield spread only 
has a significant impact before the GFC, not during the GFC. The result demonstrates 
one of my paper’s contributions, which is to reveal the changing effect of global factors 





Table 2.6: Results - Freddie Mac Press Release as Beginning of the GFC 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local Variables     
Local stock market return -0.147*** -0.057*** -0.169*** -0.168*** 
 (-22.45) (-7.26) (-14.17) (-18.12) 
Exchange rate 0.266*** 0.201*** 0.276*** 0.264*** 
 (13.39) (11.44) (11.48) (8.67) 
Currency reserve -0.006 0.009 -0.006 -0.005 
 (-0.90) (0.90) (-0.43) (-0.70) 
     
U.S. Financial Market     
Stock market excess return -0.042*** 0.015 -0.060*** -0.042*** 
 (-4.61) (1.06) (-3.12) (-4.80) 
Treasury yields -0.002 0.043*** -0.027 0.053*** 
 (-0.17) (3.40) (-1.51) (4.10) 
U.S. yield curve slope 0.012 -0.011 0.005 -0.032** 
 (1.11) (0.80) (0.40) (-2.41) 
MOVE volatility index 0.009* 0.004 0.035*** -0.000 
 (1.86) (0.58) (2.67) (-0.01) 
Investment-grade spread 0.005 0.099*** 0.003 0.006 
 (0.88) (4.71) (0.50) (0.67) 
High-yield spread 0.028*** 0.047*** -0.034 0.050*** 
 (2.93) (3.59) (-1.42) (5.53) 
     
Global Risk Premiums     
Equity premium -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.051** -0.041*** 
 (-5.72) (-3.41) (-2.05) (-4.41) 
Volatility premium 0.074*** 0.127*** 0.057** 0.067*** 
 (6.58) (5.86) (2.13) (7.56) 
Term premium -0.013* 0.013 -0.006 -0.005 






Table 2.6: Results - Freddie Mac Press Release as Beginning of the GFC (Continued) 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Global Investment Flows     
Equity flow -0.006* -0.007 -0.030 -0.007** 
 (-1.81) (-0.81) (-0.94) (-1.83) 
Bond flow 0.020*** -0.022 0.114 0.014*** 
 (5.34) (-0.78) (1.40) (3.69) 
     
Sovereign CDS Rates     
Global CDS rate 0.054*** 0.097*** 0.151*** 0.025*** 
 (8.49) (3.96) (4.92) (6.54) 
Regional CDS rate 0.033*** 0.058*** 0.047*** 0.016*** 
 (5.62) (4.24) (2.64) (2.82) 
     
Day of The Week Effects     
Monday 0.008 0.034** 0.040 -0.010 
 (0.66) (2.10) (1.01) (-0.75) 
Tuesday -0.029** -0.007 -0.001 -0.052*** 
 (-2.29) (-0.42) (-0.02) (-3.72) 
Wednesday -0.001 -0.006 0.113** -0.032** 
 (-0.06) (-0.36) (2.54) (-2.46) 
Thursday -0.003 -0.003 0.046 -0.015 
 (-0.22) (-0.17) (1.16) (-1.07) 
Observations 57,672 11,459 10,044 36,169 
Note: Dummy for Friday was omitted from regressions because of collinearity; therefore, its 
results are not reported. Beta coefficients are reported. T statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at 






Table 2.7: Results - Lehman Brothers Filing Bankruptcy as Beginning of the GFC 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local Variables     
Local stock market return -0.147*** -0.090*** -0.196*** -0.168*** 
 (-22.45) (-12.68) (-10.38) (-18.12) 
Exchange rate 0.266*** 0.213*** 0.281*** 0.264*** 
 (13.39) (15.85) (8.01) (8.67) 
Currency reserve -0.006 -0.002 0.039 -0.005 
 (-0.90) (-0.17) (0.09) (-0.70) 
     
U.S. Financial Market     
Stock market excess return -0.042*** 0.006 -0.071*** -0.042*** 
 (-4.61) (0.58) (-2.74) (-4.80) 
Treasury yields -0.002 -0.011 0.009 0.053*** 
 (-0.17) (-1.40) (0.27) (4.10) 
U.S. yield curve slope 0.012 0.018*** -0.029 -0.032** 
 (1.11) (3.34) (-0.99) (-2.41) 
MOVE volatility index 0.009* -0.003 0.107*** -0.000 
 (1.86) (-0.53) (3.50) (-0.01) 
Investment-grade spread 0.005 0.118*** -0.004 0.006 
 (0.88) (6.98) (-0.59) (0.67) 
High-yield spread 0.028*** 0.034*** -0.043 0.050*** 
 (2.93) (3.50) (-1.27) (5.53) 
     
Global Risk Premiums     
Equity premium -0.055*** -0.062*** -0.044 -0.041*** 
 (-5.72) (-5.27) (-1.05) (-4.41) 
Volatility premium 0.074*** 0.106*** 0.076** 0.067*** 
 (6.58) (7.71) (2.01) (7.56) 
Term premium -0.013* 0.007 0.042 -0.005 






Table 2.7: Results - Lehman Brothers Filing Bankruptcy as Beginning of the GFC 
(Continued) 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Global Investment Flows     
Equity flow -0.006* 0.017** 0.717 -0.007** 
 (-1.81) (2.16) (0.75) (-1.83) 
Bond flow 0.020*** -0.042 0.745 0.014*** 
 (5.34) (-1.46) (0.47) (3.69) 
     
Sovereign CDS Rates     
Global CDS rate 0.054*** 0.120*** 0.134*** 0.025*** 
 (8.49) (5.51) (3.76) (6.54) 
Regional CDS rate 0.033*** 0.024* 0.044** 0.016*** 
 (5.62) (1.82) (2.06) (2.82) 
     
Day of The Week Effects     
Monday 0.008 0.011 0.143 -0.010 
 (0.66) (0.83) (1.37) (-0.75) 
Tuesday -0.029** -0.014 0.066 -0.052*** 
 (-2.29) (-0.93) (0.58) (-3.72) 
Wednesday -0.001 -0.015 0.414*** -0.032** 
 (-0.06) (-1.02) (3.37) (-2.46) 
Thursday -0.003 0.004 0.092 -0.015 
 (-0.22) (0.30) (0.86) (-1.07) 
Observations 57,672 18,118 3,385 36,169 
Note: Dummy for Friday was omitted from regressions because of collinearity; therefore, its 
results are not reported. Beta coefficients are reported. T statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at 






Table 2.8: Results - Dow Jones Lowest as Ending of the GFC 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local Variables     
Local stock market return -0.147*** -0.062*** -0.175*** -0.172*** 
 (-22.45) (-8.19) (-12.25) (-18.81) 
Exchange rate 0.266*** 0.213*** 0.251*** 0.272*** 
 (13.39) (12.57) (8.96) (9.25) 
Currency reserve -0.006 0.022* -0.012 -0.003 
 (-0.90) (1.79) (-0.72) (-0.41) 
     
U.S. Financial Market     
Stock market excess return -0.042*** 0.007 -0.083*** -0.045*** 
 (-4.61) (0.51) (-3.26) (-5.17) 
Treasury yields -0.002 0.020 -0.038* 0.059*** 
 (-0.17) (1.54) (-1.91) (4.58) 
U.S. yield curve slope 0.012 0.003 0.001 -0.029** 
 (1.11) (0.24) (0.06) (-2.17) 
MOVE volatility index 0.009* 0.006 0.020 0.002 
 (1.86) (1.04) (1.13) (0.30) 
Investment-grade spread 0.005 0.122*** 0.016 -0.005 
 (0.88) (5.47) (1.48) (-0.74) 
High-yield spread 0.028*** 0.050*** -0.025 0.048*** 
 (2.93) (3.88) (-0.94) (5.26) 
     
Global Risk Premiums     
Equity premium -0.055*** -0.041*** -0.003 -0.058*** 
 (-5.72) (-2.92) (-0.12) (-5.37) 
Volatility premium 0.074*** 0.137*** 0.050 0.064*** 
 (6.58) (7.12) (1.46) (7.07) 
Term premium -0.013* 0.013 -0.002 -0.024*** 






Table 2.8: Results - Dow Jones Hitting Lowest Level as Ending of the GFC 
(Continued) 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Global Investment Flows     
Equity flow -0.006* 0.011 0.087** -0.008** 
 (-1.81) (1.21) (2.32) (-2.15) 
Bond flow 0.020*** -0.047 0.121 0.015*** 
 (5.34) (-1.58) (1.20) (4.13) 
     
Sovereign CDS Rates     
Global CDS rate 0.054*** 0.106*** 0.203*** 0.027*** 
 (8.49) (4.17) (4.80) (6.52) 
Regional CDS rate 0.033*** 0.047*** 0.027 0.021*** 
 (5.62) (3.19) (1.18) (3.73) 
     
Day of The Week Effects     
Monday 0.008 0.033** -0.032 0.006 
 (0.66) (2.24) (-0.62) (0.40) 
Tuesday -0.029** -0.019 0.027 -0.047*** 
 (-2.29) (-1.25) (0.45) (-3.35) 
Wednesday -0.001 -0.008 0.154** -0.026** 
 (-0.06) (-0.48) (2.54) (-2.02) 
Thursday -0.003 -0.117 0.129** -0.021 
 (-0.22) (-1.09) (2.38) (-1.50) 
Observations 57,672 13,400 6,747 37,525 
Note: Dummy for Friday was omitted from regressions because of collinearity; therefore, its 
results are not reported. Beta coefficients are reported. T statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at 






Table 2.9: Results - January 31, 2010 as Ending of the GFC 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local Variables     
Local stock market return -0.147*** -0.062*** -0.169*** -0.177*** 
 (-22.45) (-8.19) (-14.76) (-18.16) 
Exchange rate 0.266*** 0.213*** 0.280*** 0.259*** 
 (13.39) (12.57) (12.53) (8.19) 
Currency reserve -0.006 0.022* -0.023 -0.009 
 (-0.90) (1.79) (-1.59) (-1.28) 
     
U.S. Financial Market     
Stock market excess return -0.042*** 0.007 -0.075*** -0.025*** 
 (-4.61) (0.51) (-4.45) (-2.69) 
Treasury yields -0.002 0.020 -0.018 0.058*** 
 (-0.17) (1.54) (-1.10) (4.30) 
U.S. yield curve slope 0.012 0.003 0.007 -0.037*** 
 (1.11) (0.24) (0.57) (-2.69) 
MOVE volatility index 0.009* 0.006 0.032** 0.001 
 (1.86) (1.04) (2.24) (0.14) 
Investment-grade spread 0.005 0.122*** 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.88) (5.47) (0.37) (-0.14) 
High-yield spread 0.028*** 0.050*** -0.015 0.034*** 
 (2.93) (3.88) (-0.69) (3.45) 
     
Global Risk Premiums     
Equity premium -0.055*** -0.041*** -0.021 -0.092*** 
 (-5.72) (-2.92) (-1.62) (-8.58) 
Volatility premium 0.074*** 0.137*** 0.057** 0.058*** 
 (6.58) (7.12) (2.23) (6.24) 
Term premium -0.013* 0.013 -0.001 -0.010 






Table 2.9: Results - January 31, 2010 as Ending of the GFC (Continued) 
Dependent variable: ∆(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Global Investment Flows     
Equity flow -0.006* 0.011 -0.011 -0.008** 
 (-1.81) (1.21) (-0.37) (-2.07) 
Bond flow 0.020*** -0.047 0.099 0.015*** 
 (5.34) (-1.58) (1.35) (4.10) 
     
Sovereign CDS Rates     
Global CDS rate 0.054*** 0.106*** 0.153*** 0.021*** 
 (8.49) (4.17) (5.25) (5.67) 
Regional CDS rate 0.033*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.012** 
 (5.62) (3.19) (3.06) (2.14) 
     
Day of The Week Effects     
Monday 0.008 0.033** -0.006 0.001 
 (0.66) (2.24) (-0.16) (0.06) 
Tuesday -0.029** -0.019 0.000 -0.042*** 
 (-2.29) (-1.25) (0.01) (-2.88) 
Wednesday -0.001 -0.008 0.136*** -0.036** 
 (-0.06) (-0.48) (3.19) (-2.72) 
Thursday -0.003 -0.017 0.050 -0.018 
 (-0.22) (-1.09) (1.32) (-1.21) 
Observations 57,672 13,400 10,625 33,647 
Note: Dummy for Friday was omitted from regressions because of collinearity; therefore, its 
results are not reported. Beta coefficients are reported. T statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
I study the drivers of daily sovereign CDS rates for a group of emerging markets before, 
during, and after the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. Specifically, I use principal 
component analysis and panel regressions estimated over the periods July 2004-August 
2007, August 2007-June 2009, and July 2009-December 2017 to establish the evolving 





is the first to provide insights into sovereign CDS dynamics during the post-crisis 
period. 
 The principal component analysis shows that EMs’ sovereign CDS rates tend 
to be more correlated across countries than are local stock market returns for the same 
countries. Also, the level of commonality in EMs’ sovereign CDS rates increased 
substantially during the crisis period and remained at a high level after the crisis ends. 
The regression analysis provides two main findings. First, two local factors, stock 
market returns and the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, have significant 
explanatory power for that country’s sovereign CDS rate in the pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post-crisis periods. Second, EMs’ sovereign CDS rates are significantly related to 
global factors during the crisis period and the post-crisis period. The global factors can 
be grouped into four categories (U.S. financial market, global risk premium, global 
investment flows, and CDS rates of other sovereigns). However, the relative strength 
of variables within each category vary over time. When designing monetary policies 
and investment strategies, policymakers and investors in EMs should not only keep an 






A Appendix for Chapter 1 
 
 
Table A.1: Emerging Markets Sovereign Defaults (1999-2016) 
Date Country 
May 25, 1999 Russia 
October 22, 1999 Ecuador 
February 25, 2009 Pakistan 
March 21, 2000 Cote d’Ivoire 
November 30, 2011 Argentina 
June 13, 2002 Moldova 
May 3, 2003 Uruguay 
December 30, 2004 Grenada 
April 20, 2005 Dominican Republic 
December 7, 2006 Belize 
October 23, 2008 Seychelles 
December 16, 2008 Ecuador 
January 31, 2011  Cote d’Ivoire 
September 20, 2012 Belize 
March 15, 2013 Grenada 
July 30, 2014 Argentina 





Table A.2: List of Corporates in the Sample 
Firm Headquarter Sector 
% of Direct State 
Ownership 
% of Ultimate 
State Ownership 




Ambev Brazil Consumer Goods 0.0 0.0 88 1.2 
Braskem Brazil Basic Materials 0.0 28.3 236 0.8 
CSN Brazil Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 147 0.7 
Embraer Brazil Industrials 0.0 50.1 174 0.6 
Gerdau Brazil Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 138 0.9 
JBS Brazil Consumer Goods 0.0 0.0 308 1.5 
Petrobras Brazil Energy 60.1 60.1 617 12.4 
Usiminas Brazil Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 98 0.4 
Vale Brazil Basic Materials 6.5 50.1 434 4.7 
Arauco Chile Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 52 5.5 
CAP Chile Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 33 2.3 
Codelco Chile Basic Materials 100.0 100.0 162 13.5 
ENAP Chile Energy 100.0 100.0 107 2.2 
Enel Generacion Chile Chile Utilities 0.0 0.0 86 3.6 
Sociedad Química y Minera Chile Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 51 1.8 
Transelec Chile Energy 0.0 0.0 26 1.5 
China Comms. Construction China Industrials 88.0 88.0 37 1.0 
China Mobile China Telecommunications 72.7 72.7 67 1.9 
China Resources Enterprise China Industrials 51.9 51.9 98 0.2 





CITIC Pacific China Industrials 58.0 58.0 163 7.9 
CNOOC China Energy 64.4 64.4 128 0.9 
Sinopec China Energy 75.8 75.8 381 2.0 
Genting Malaysia Consumer Services 0.0 0.0 188 6.6 
IOI Corporation Malaysia Consumer Goods 0.0 0.0 69 1.3 
MISC Malaysia Industrials 65.0 73.8 75 3.8 
Petronas Malaysia Energy 100.0 100.0 164 44.5 
Telekom Malaysia Malaysia Telecommunications 28.0 28.0 133 1.9 
Tenaga Nasional Malaysia Utilities 41.8 41.8 218 10.2 
YTL Corp Malaysia Utilities 0.0 0.0 10 5.7 
América Móvil Mexico Telecommunications 0.0 0.0 305 6.2 
Cemex Mexico Consumer Goods 0.0 0.0 125 2.6 
Federal Electricity 
Commission 
Mexico Utilities 100.0 100.0 131 6.3 
Grupo Bimbo Mexico Consumer Goods 0.0 0.0 17 1.0 
Grupo Televisa Mexico Telecommunications 0.0 0.0 80 1.2 
Pemex Mexico Energy 100.0 100.0 408 9.9 
Telefonos De Mexico Mexico Telecommunications 0.0 0.0 38 0.5 
JG Summit Holdings Philippines Consumer Services 0.0 0.0 40 4.2 
National Power Corporation Philippines Utilities 100.0 100.0 30 0.3 
PLDT Philippines Telecommunications 0.0 0.0 230 3.0 
San Miguel Corporation Philippines Utilities 0.0 0.0 105 8.6 
Alrosa Russia Basic Materials 44.0 77.0 247 0.4 





Gazprom Neft Russia Energy 0.0 48.1 274 2.4 
Russian Railways Russia Industrials 100.0 100.0 500 6.6 
Lukoil Russia Energy 0.0 0.0 413 5.6 
Mobile Telesystems Russia Telecommunications 0.0 0.0 274 0.6 
Rosneft Russia Energy 50.1 50.1 646 9.8 
Severstal Russia Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 256 0.4 
Sistema Russia Telecommunications 0.0 0.0 272 1.2 
Transneft Russia Energy 100.0 100.0 367 2.6 
AngloGold Ashanti South Africa Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 177 2.4 
Eskom Holdings South Africa Utilities 100.0 100.0 152 14.4 
Sappi South Africa Basic Materials 0.0 0.0 48 1.6 
Sasol South Africa Energy 12.3 25.8 124 8.2 
Transnet South Africa Industrials 100.0 100.0 44 8.9 
PTT Global Chemical Thailand Basic Materials 0.0 25.9 98 2.8 
PTT Exploration & 
Production 
Thailand Energy 0.0 34.8 125 5.0 
PTT Public Company Thailand Energy 51.1 52.5 115 14.4 
Thai Oil Thailand Energy 0.0 26.1 47 1.4 
True Company Thailand Telecommunications 0.0 0.0 35 2.2 
Note: last column reports each corporation’s total assets as a share of its headquarter’s GDP, average of 2014 to 2016. Data on corporations’ total assets are from 






Table A.3: List of Banks in the Sample 
Bank Headquarter 
% of Direct State 
Ownership 
Banco BMG Brazil 0.0 
Banco Bradesco Brazil 0.0 
Banco Do Brasil Brazil 96.9 
Banco Panamericano Brazil 0.0 
Banco Votorantim Brazil 0.0 
Itaú Unibanco Brazil 0.0 
Banco de Chile Chile 0.0 
Banco Santander - Chile Chile 0.0 
Agricultural Bank of China China 79.2 
Bank of China China 67.6 
Bank of Communications China 26.5 
China CITIC Bank International (CNCBI) China 0.0 
China Construction Bank China 57.0 
China Everbright Bank China 22.0 
China Merchants Bank China 12.4 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China China 70.7 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank China 0.0 
AmBank Malaysia 0.0 
CIMB Bank Malaysia Malaysia 28.1 
Hong Leong Bank Malaysia 0.0 
Malayan Banking Berhad (Maybank) Malaysia 0.0 
Public Bank Berhad Malaysia 0.0 
RHB Bank Berhad Malaysia 0.0 
BBVA Bancomer Mexico 0.0 
Banco Mercantil del Norte Mexico 0.0 
Nacional Financiera Mexico 0.0 
BDO Unibank Philippines 0.0 
Land Bank of the Philippines Philippines 100.0 
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company Philippines 0.0 
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation Philippines 0.0 
Alfa-Bank Russia 0.0 
Bank of Moscow Russia 44.0 
Bank Otkritie Financial Corporation Russia 0.0 
Gazprombank Russia 0.0 
Home Credit and Finance Bank Russia 0.0 
MDM Bank Russia 0.0 
Promsvyazbank Russia 0.0 
Russian Agricultural Bank Russia 100.0 
Russian Standard Bank Russia 0.0 





TransCreditBank Russia 0.0 
Uralsib Bank Russia 0.0 
Vnesheconombank (VEB) Russia 100.0 
VTB Bank Russia 80.5 
Zenit Bank Russia 0.0 
FirstRand Bank South Africa 0.0 
Standard Bank of South Africa South Africa 0.0 
Bangkok Bank Thailand 0.0 
Export-Import Bank of Thailand Thailand 100.0 
Kasikornbank Thailand 0.0 
Krung Thai Bank Thailand 55.1 
Siam Commercial Bank Thailand 23.7 







Table A.4: Summary Statistics for High-frequency Event-study Analysis, All Dates 
 Obs. Mean St. 
Dev. 
Min. Median Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Whole Sample         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)      35734 -0.002 0.041 -1.716 -0.001 0.832 -4.728 171.3 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)   35734 0.003 0.030 -0.210 0.002 0.192 0.129 5.977 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)            29743 0.000 0.015 -0.112 0.000 0.129 0.100 9.523 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠) 35734 -0.001 0.029 -0.847 0.000 0.747 -3.749 160.0 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)   35734 0.000 0.010 -0.129 0.000 0.147 0.422 27.04 
Brazil         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  5451 -0.003 0.049 -0.955 -0.001 0.832 -4.828 129.7 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  5451 0.003 0.031 -0.133 0.003 0.138 0.069 5.135 
Chile         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  3814 -0.002 0.025 -0.455 -0.000 0.348 -4.994 125.3 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  3814 0.006 0.032 -0.152 0.005 0.160 -0.023 5.775 
China         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  3654 -0.003 0.048 -1.716 -0.000 0.677 -12.61 466.1 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  3654 0.004 0.024 -0.079 0.003 0.116 0.418 4.630 
Malaysia         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  4282 -0.001 0.030 -0.133 -0.003 0.185 0.805 6.292 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  4282 0.002 0.029 -0.096 0.000 0.162 0.462 5.040 
Mexico         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  4497 -0.001 0.029 -0.640 -0.001 0.214 -3.278 77.06 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  4497 0.003 0.033 -0.210 0.002 0.147 -0.200 6.471 
Philippines         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  1852 -0.010 0.086 -0.503 -0.002 0.573 -0.821 18.03 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  1852 0.003 0.024 -0.092 0.002 0.096 0.306 4.213 
Russia         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 6279 -0.001 0.030 -0.462 -0.000 0.410 -0.065 29.86 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 6279 0.002 0.035 -0.163 0.004 0.192 0.088 5.618 
South Africa         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  2946 -0.003 0.044 -0.817 -0.001 0.519 -5.507 110.3 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  2946 0.003 0.025 -0.116 0.002 0.150 0.337 5.616 
Thailand         
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  2959 -0.003 0.029 -0.218 -0.000 0.257 0.038 13.74 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  2959 0.002 0.023 -0.073 0.001 0.125 0.723 6.252 
Note: CDS data cover all trading dates from 1/1/2014 to 12/29/2016.  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) and 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) are the daily log change in corporate CDS rates and sovereign CDS rates, 
respectively.  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) is the daily log change in the close price of a country’s major stock 
index.  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠) is the daily log change in the relevant commodity price associated with 
each corporation.  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠) is the daily log change in the country’s foreign exchange rate 
against the US dollar. 
Source: CDS data are from Markit. Stock index data are from Bloomberg. Commodity prices and 








Table A.5: Selected Government Bailout/Guarantee of SOEs 
 
Country Company Year Detail 
Brazil Petrobras 2016 
Brazilian President Dilma Rousse said her 
government is willing to bailout Petrobras, the 
state-run oil company if the oil prices continue to 
decline. 
Chile Codelco 2016 
Chilean government announced a capital injection 
of USD975 million for the company in December 
2016. 
Chile ENAP 2013 
Chilean government approved a payment of up to 
USD60 million in 2013. Past government support 
included “a temporary capitalization of retained 
earnings at ENAPs subsidiaries in both 2008 and 
2009, temporary suspension of tax payments in 
2009, capitalization of profits between 2009 and 
2011, and a USD250 million equity injection in 
2008”.[25] 
China BOC, CBC 2004 
China announced a USD45 billion bailout of 2 
state-owned Banks, intending to help control fraud 
and limit bad loans. 
Malaysia Malaysian Airline 2014 
The nation’s state investment firm, which controls 
nearly 70% of Malaysian Airline, disclosed a 
USD430 million plan to restore the airline’s 
financial strength. 
Malaysia Felda 2019 
Malaysia announced an RM6.23 billion financial 
aid for state-owned national land development 
agency Felda to revive the indebted organization. 
Mexico Pemex 2016 
Years of losses have left Pemex with substantial 
unfunded pension liabilities and on the hook for 
billions to suppliers. The Mexican government had 
to come to the rescue with USD4.4 billion in aid. 
Mexico Pemex 2019 
Mexico injected USD3.9 billion into ailing Pemex, 
promising to strengthen its finances and prevent a 
further credit downgrade. 
Russia Russian Railways 2016 
Government support for Russian Railways from all 
budgets totaled RUB 94.9 billion in 2016, 
including federal budget subsidies of RUB 93.6 
billion. 
South Africa Eskom 2019 
South Africa’s government brought forward the 
bailout of Eskom after the company rushed 5 
billion rand (USD355 million) to the struggling 
utility earlier to avert a default and said more cash 
could be needed soon. 
Source: major news outlets, reports from credit rating agencies, and companies’ websites.   
 





Table A.6: Summary Statistics for “Government Dependent” Variable 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max. 
Brazil 17 0.042 0.020 0.012 0.038 0.095 
Chile 17 0.028 0.017 0.000 0.028 0.054 
China 17 0.024 0.008 0.011 0.025 0.041 
Malaysia 17 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.012 0.032 
Mexico 17 0.057 0.035 0.014 0.046 0.131 
Philippines 17 0.036 0.019 0.000 0.036 0.071 
Russia 17 0.049 0.018 0.022 0.048 0.088 
South Africa 17 0.044 0.027 0.000 0.043 0.106 
Thailand 17 0.030 0.018 0.008 0.022 0.067 
Note: the “Government Dependent” variable at the sector level is the number of news articles 
having “Government Contracts” or “Regulation/Government Policy” as a topic, as a percentage 
of the total news articles for that sector. 
Source: Factiva and the author’s calculation. 
 
 
Table A.7: Government Dependent Sectors 
Country Sector Country Sector 
Brazil Health Care/Life Sciences Chile Real Estate/Construction 
 Business/Consumer Services  Health Care/Life Sciences 
 Technology  Leisure/Arts/Hospitality 
 Media/Entertainment  Technology 
China Financial Services Malaysia Financial Services 
 Automotive  Energy 
 Telecommunication Services  Media/Entertainment 
 Agriculture  Business/Consumer Services 
Mexico Health Care/Life Sciences Philippines Industrial Goods 
 Media/Entertainment  Utilities 
 Telecommunication Services  Automotive 
 Technology  Business/Consumer Services 
Russia Health Care/Life Sciences South Africa Telecommunication Services 
 Media/Entertainment  Automotive 
 Technology  Consumer Goods 
 Utilities  Transportation/Logistics 
Thailand Agriculture   
 Media/Entertainment   
 Consumer Goods   
 Technology   







Table A.8: Summary Statistics for Financial-development Measures 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max. 
DEP 27 1.182 0.722 0.244 0.994 2.758 
CRE 24 0.787 0.183 0.440 0.823 0.980 
Note: DEP is the ratio of the aggregate value of all bank deposits extended by banks to the 
private sector to the country’s stock market capitalization. CRE is the ratio of bank credit to the 
private non-financial sector to total credit to the private non-financial sector. 




Table A.9: High-frequency Event-study Analysis - Financial Development 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   
 Financial Development 
 Country-level 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                  0.630*** 0.637*** 1.067*** 1.078*** 
 (5.43) (5.61) (3.28) (3.28) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       -0.178** -0.182**   
 (-2.32) (-2.41)   
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗        -0.917*** -0.933*** 
   (-2.80) (-2.81) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                               -0.501*** -0.508*** -0.498*** -0.504*** 
 (-18.56) (-18.94) (-13.72) (-14.16) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                    -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.086*** 
 (-6.22) (-6.18) (-5.47) (-5.42) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.255*** 0.252*** 0.257*** 0.254*** 
 (8.29) (8.36) (6.75) (6.74) 
Country/Sector FE N Y N Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8,988 8,988 8,753 8,753 
Note: columns (1) and (2) report results where corporate CDS interacts with DEP, the ratio of 
the aggregate value of all bank deposits extended by banks to the private sector to the country’s 
stock market capitalization. Columns (3) and (4) report results where corporate CDS interacts 
with CRE, the share of bank credit in total credit to the private non-financial sector. T statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and 





Table A.10: Alternative Specification with NEWS Dummy and Three Channels 
Dependent variable: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗        
Independent variable (1) (2) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗          0.231*** 0.232*** 
 (5.83) (5.84) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (15.88) (15.95) 
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 0.105*** 0.104*** 
 (17.34) (17.32) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       0.061*** 0.060*** 
 (2.65) (2.63) 
𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗      0.011 0.011 
 (0.58) (0.60) 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 0.171*** 0.172*** 
 (3.64) (3.70) 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       0.002 0.000 
 (0.05) (0.00) 
𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 -0.009 -0.008 
 (-0.20) (-0.19) 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 0.014* 0.013 
 (1.89) (1.87) 
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 · 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗      0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (3.70) (3.70) 
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 · 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗     -0.004 -0.004 
 (-0.25) (-0.26) 
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 · 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 0.050 0.048 
 (1.48) (1.44) 
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 · 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       0.033 0.034 
 (1.03) (1.08) 
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 · 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 -0.031 -0.032 
 (-0.87) (-0.90) 
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 · 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.18) (-0.14) 
Controls not reported   
Country/Sector FE N Y 
Time FE Y Y 
Observations 26,036 26,036 
Note: standard beta coefficients are reported. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 





Table A.11: Two-day Event Window Results – Fiscal Channel 
Dependent variable: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2           
 State Ownership Gov. Dependence 
 one-day window two-day window one-day window two-day window 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2    0.268*** 0.281*** 0.288*** 0.302*** 
 (4.60) (4.31) (4.68) (4.50) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · [𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2]   0.352*** 0.447***   
 (3.55) (5.39)   
𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · [𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2]        0.304** 0.446*** 
   (2.15) (5.49) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2  -0.508*** -0.552*** -0.508*** -0.557*** 
 (-18.06) (-17.09) (-16.92) (-16.33) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2                     -0.088*** -0.103*** -0.090*** -0.107*** 
 (-6.02) (-7.38) (-5.83) (-7.51) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2          0.253*** 0.322*** 0.264*** 0.338*** 
 (7.98) (6.83) (7.99) (6.83) 
Country/Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,107 9,020 9,107 9,020 
Note: columns (1) and (2) interact corporate CDS with SOE, which is a dummy for whether the corporation has 100% ultimate state ownership, and 
column (2) includes country fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) interact corporate CDS with a dummy variable GOV, which takes a value of one if a 
corporation operates in a sector that has “government dependence” value higher than 75th percentile of sectors in the country sample, and zero 
otherwise. Columns (1) and (3) report regression results using a one-day event window. Columns (2) and (4) report regression results using a two-
day event window. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance 





Table A.12: Two-day Event Window Results – Size Channel 
Dependent variable: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2           













Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2         0.198*** 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.209*** 0.221*** 0.236 *** 
 (3.83) (3.54) (3.74) (3.41) (3.70) (3.27) 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 · [𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2]           0.376*** 0.431***     
 (6.04) (6.80)     
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 · [𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2]             0.352*** 0.371***   
   (5.28) (5.09)   
𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 · [𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2]                0.261*** 0.248*** 
     (3.23) (2.89) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2                                           -0.479*** -0.516*** -0.484*** -0.527*** -0.493*** -0.538*** 
 (-20.23) (-20.19) (-19.81) (-19.69) (-19.13) (-19.26) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2                     -0.084*** -0.100*** -0.080*** -0.095*** -0.090*** -0.108*** 
 (-6.37) (-8.07) (-5.91) (-7.17) (-6.28) (-7.95) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2   0.242*** 0.296*** 0.237*** 0.297*** 0.257*** 0.330*** 
 (8.41) (6.82) (8.21) (6.73) (8.32) (7.00) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,107 9,020 9,107 9,020 9,107 9,020 
Note: columns (1) and (2) interact corporate CDS with ASST,  a dummy for whether the corporation has total assets higher than 75th percentile of its country level; 
columns (3) and (4) interact corporate CDS with LIAB, a dummy for whether the corporation has total liabilities higher than 75th percentile of its country level; 
columns (5) and (6) interact corporate CDS with TAX, a dummy for whether the corporation has total taxation higher than 75th percentile of its country level. 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) report regression results using a one-day event window. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report regression results using a two-day event window. 






Table A.13: Two-day Event Window Results - Financial Channel 
Dependent variable: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2         





Independent variable (1) (2) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2          0.293*** 0.291*** 
 (4.66) (4.46) 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2 · [𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2]    0.046** 0.203*** 
 (2.12) (4.37) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2      0.094*** 0.149*** 
 (11.15) (10.79) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2                         -0.486*** -0.512*** 
 (-16.67) (-16.15) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2  -0.090*** -0.108*** 
 (-5.98) (-7.61) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−2    0.255*** 0.294*** 
 (7.81) (6.26) 
Country/Sector FE Y Y 
Time FE Y Y 
Observations 8,988 8,822 
Note: columns (1) and (2) interact bank CDS with a dummy variable BANK, which takes a 
value of one if country j on date t experiences a news release on any of the banks included in 
the sample, and zero otherwise. Column (1) reports regression results using a one-day event 
window. Column (2) reports regression results using a two-day event window. T statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and 





Table A.14: Falsification Test Results – Fiscal Channel 
 State Ownership Gov. Dependence 
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                   0.076** 0.074** 0.098*** 0.092*** 
 (1.96) (1.96) (4.52) (4.02) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       0.083 0.070   
 (1.30) (1.13)   
𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗        -0.020 -0.016 
   (-0.38) (-0.32) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                               -0.070** -0.064** -0.070** -0.057* 
 (-2.34) (-2.12) (-2.33) (-1.79) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                   0.011 0.013 0.009 0.011 
 (0.71) (0.83) (0.59) (0.65) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.517*** 0.525*** 0.518*** 0.521*** 
 (7.31) (7.21) (7.31) (6.89) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 
Note: columns (1) and (2) interact corporate CDS with SOE, which is a dummy for whether the 
corporation has 100% ultimate state ownership, and column (2) includes country fixed effects. Columns 
(3) and (4) interact corporate CDS with a dummy variable GOV, which takes a value of one if a 
corporation operates in a sector that has “government dependence” value higher than 75th percentile of 
sectors in the country sample, and zero otherwise. Column (4) includes country and sector fixed effects. 
T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** 





Table A.15: Falsification Test Results – Size Channel 
 Total Assets Total Liabilities Taxation 
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                       0.050 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.054 0.052 
 (1.48) (1.48) (1.39) (1.38) (1.48) (1.48) 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗        0.126*** 0.118***     
 (2.96) (2.83)     
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗          0.123*** 0.117***   
   (2.75) (2.74)   
𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗              0.106** 0.101** 
     (2.25) (2.24) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                               -0.056* -0.051* -0.059** -0.054* -0.062** -0.057* 
 (-1.93) (-1.73) (-2.02) (-1.82) (-2.13) (-1.92) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                    0.013 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.014 
 (0.87) (0.98) (0.88) (1.00) (0.78) (0.92) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.507*** 0.515*** 0.507*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.522*** 
 (7.26) (7.16) (7.26) (7.17) (7.29) (7.19) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 
Note: columns (1) and (2) interact corporate CDS with ASST, which is a dummy for whether the corporation has total assets higher than 75th percentile 
of its country level; columns (3) and (4) interact corporate CDS with LIAB, which is a dummy for whether the corporation has total liabilities higher 
than 75th percentile of its country level; columns (5) and (6) interact corporate CDS with TAX, which is a dummy for whether the corporation has 
total taxation higher than 75th percentile of its country level. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are “Newey-West” HAC standard 





Table A.16: Falsification Test Results - Financial Channel 
Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 
 Bank Stress 
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−1 
Independent variable (1) (2) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                       0.084** 0.080** 
 (2.00) (1.99) 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 · ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                0.083*** 0.085*** 
 (3.37) (3.48) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                                   0.008 0.008 
 (0.80) (0.74) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                               -0.063** -0.056* 
 (-2.08) (-1.83) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                    0.011 0.013 
 (0.74) (0.84) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    0.513*** 0.522*** 
 (7.25) (7.17) 
Country/Sector FE Y Y 
Time FE Y Y 
Observations 4,612 4,612 
Note: columns (1) and (2) interact bank CDS with a dummy variable BANK, which takes a 
value of one if country j on date t experiences a news release on any of the banks included in 
the sample, and zero otherwise. T statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
“Newey-West” HAC standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 






Table A.17: Extreme Value Analysis - Baseline Regression Results (5th-percentile 
Threshold, with Bank Extreme Values Excluded) 
Dependent variable: a dummy=1 if the sovereign experiences an extreme change in CDS 
rate in day t 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dummy for corp. CDS 
extreme changes 
2.039*** 2.039*** 2.003*** 2.002*** 1.930*** 
(10.07) (10.09) (9.69) (9.69) (9.25) 
Daily change in commodity 
price 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 
 (-1.02) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-1.37) 
Daily change in TED spread   
  0.133*** 0.133*** 0.094*** 
  (7.17) (7.22) (5.55) 
Daily change in US Repo rate    -5.879 -4.527 
   (-1.34) (-1.10) 
Daily change in VIX 
    0.193*** 
    (10.56) 
Observations 31,083 31,083 31,083 31,083 29,049 
Note: standard error clustered at the country level and z statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
 
Table A.18: Extreme Value Analysis - Baseline Regression Results (1st-percentile 
Threshold, with Bank Extreme Values Excluded) 
Dependent variable: a dummy=1 if the sovereign experiences an extreme change in CDS 
rate in day t 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dummy for corp. CDS 
extreme changes 
3.051*** 3.046*** 2.984*** 2.983*** 2.848*** 
(11.37) (11.33) (10.85) (10.82) (10.75) 
Daily change in commodity 
price 
 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (3.13) (3.02) (2.93) (3.32) 
Daily change in TED spread   
  0.088** 0.088** 0.057 
  (2.31) (2.39) (1.48) 
Daily change in US Repo rate    -25.13 -24.11 
   (-1.25) (-1.24) 
Daily change in VIX 
    0.183*** 
    (9.08) 
Observations 33,858 33,858 33,858 33,858 33,858 
Note: standard error clustered at the country level and z statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** 







B Appendix for Chapter 2 
 
Table B.1: Timeline of Selective Major Events during the Global Financial Crisis 
Date Event 
February 27, 2007 Freddie Mac announces that it will no longer buy the riskiest subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities. 
April 2, 2007 New Century Financial Corporation, a leading subprime mortgage lender, files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
August 9, 2007 BNP Paribas, France’s largest bank, halts redemptions on three investment funds. 
August 10, 2007 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that it “will provide 
reserves as necessary...to promote trading in the federal funds 
market at rates close to the FOMC’s target rate of 5.25 percent.” 
December 12, 2007 
The Federal Reserve Board and other central banks announce 
measures designed to address elevated pressures in short-term 
funding markets. 
February 13, 2008 President Bush signs the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 into law. 
July 30, 2008 President Bush signs into law the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. 
September 7, 2008 The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) places Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government conservatorship. 
September 15, 2008 
Lehman Brothers files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Bank 
of America announces its intent to purchase Merrill Lynch for $50 
billion. 
October 3, 2008 
Congress passes and President Bush signs into law the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which establishes the $700 
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
December 1, 2008 
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research announces that a peak in U.S. economic 
activity occurred in December 2007 and that the economy has 
since been in a recession. 
December 16, 2008 The FOMC votes to establish a target range for the effective federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25 percent. 
February 17, 2009 
President Obama signs into law the “American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009”, which includes a variety of spending 
measures and tax cuts intended to promote economic recovery. 
March 6, 2009 The Dow Jones industrial average (DJIA) hit its lowest level of 6,443.27. 
September 20, 2010 
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research announces June 2009 business cycle 
trough/end of the last recession. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ Financial Crisis Timeline and the National 






Table B.1: Definitions, Sources, Frequencies of Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Frequency Source Definition 
Local Stock Market 
Return Daily Bloomberg 
Percentage changes in the adjusted close price 
of the country’s major stock market index 
Exchange Rate Daily Bloomberg Percentage changes in the units of the local currency per U.S. dollar 
Foreign Currency 
Reserve Monthly IMF 
Percentage changes in the dollar value of the 
country’s holdings of foreign reserves 
U.S. Stock Market 
Excess Return Daily WRDS 
Changes in value-weighted return on all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-
month Treasury-bill return 
Treasury Yields Daily WRDS Changes in the five-year constant maturity Treasury (CMT) rates 
U.S. Yield Curve 
Slope Daily WRDS 
Changes in the difference between the 10-year 
Treasury bond rate and the 3-month Treasury 
bill rate 
MOVE Volatility 
Index Daily Bloomberg 
Changes in the MOVE index, a yield-curve- 
weighted index of the normalized implied 
volatility on 1-month Treasury options and is 
expected to capture risk preferences in fixed 
income markets 
Investment-grade 
Spread Daily FRED 
Changes in the basis-point yield spread 
between BBB and AAA industrial bond 
indexes 
High-yield Spread Daily FRED Changes in the basis-point yield spread between BB and BBB industrial bond indexes 
Equity Premium Daily Bloomberg Changes in the price-earnings ratio for the S&P 100 index 
Volatility Premium Daily CBOE, Bloomberg 
Changes in the difference between the VIX 
index and Garman-Klass measure of realized 
volatility for the S&P 100 index 
Term Premium Daily CRSP 
Changes in the expected excess returns on five-
year Treasury bonds, represented as a linear 
function of one- through five-year forward 
rates. The estimated parameters used in the 







Changes in the net new flows (inflow minus 
outflow) into mutual funds investing primarily 
in equity, in millions USD 




Changes in the net new flows (inflow minus 
outflow) into mutual funds investing primarily 
in bonds, in millions USD 
Global Sovereign 
CDS Rate Daily Markit 
Changes in the average of CDS rates for all of 
the countries outside that country’s region 
Reginal Sovereign 
CDS Rate Daily Markit 
Changes in the average of CDS rates for all of 





Table B.2: Correlation Matrix of Sovereign CDS Rate Changes 
 
Brazil Chile China 
Czech 
Republic Egypt Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico 
Brazil 1.00         
Chile 0.65 1.00        
China 0.34 0.41 1.00       
Czech Republic 0.34 0.45 0.42 1.00      
Egypt 0.17 0.19 0.28 0.29 1.00     
Indonesia 0.36 0.39 0.75 0.39 0.26 1.00    
Korea 0.36 0.41 0.84 0.49 0.30 0.76 1.00   
Malaysia 0.36 0.42 0.84 0.42 0.27 0.77 0.83 1.00  
Mexico 0.80 0.77 0.39 0.46 0.18 0.38 0.40 0.41 1.00 
Pakistan 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.06 
Peru 0.79 0.68 0.38 0.41 0.18 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.84 
Philippines 0.38 0.37 0.73 0.42 0.23 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.41 
Qatar 0.33 0.39 0.43 0.45 0.30 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.36 
Russia 0.56 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.27 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.60 
South Africa 0.55 0.60 0.52 0.57 0.26 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.62 
Thailand 0.33 0.38 0.82 0.41 0.26 0.75 0.84 0.85 0.37 











Table B.3: Correlation Matrix of Sovereign CDS Rate Changes (Continued) 
 
 Pakistan Peru Philippines Qatar Russia South Africa Thailand Turkey 
Brazil         
Chile         
China         
Czech Republic         
Egypt         
Indonesia         
Korea         
Malaysia         
Mexico         
Pakistan 1.0        
Peru 0.08 1.0       
Philippines 0.09 0.43 1.0      
Qatar 0.09 0.34 0.41 1.0     
Russia 0.08 0.57 0.49 0.48 1.0    
South Africa 0.07 0.57 0.51 0.50 0.75 1.0   
Thailand 0.09 0.37 0.74 0.43 0.49 0.51 1.0  











Table B.3: Correlation Matrix of Local Stock Market Returns 
 
Brazil Chile China 
Czech 
Republic Egypt Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico 
Brazil 1.00         
Chile 0.99 1.00        
China 0.16 0.18 1.00       
Czech Republic 0.42 0.41 0.17 1.00      
Egypt 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.20 1.00     
Indonesia 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.40 0.23 1.00    
Korea 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.42 0.19 0.52 1.00   
Malaysia 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.36 0.21 0.53 0.48 1.00  
Mexico 0.56 0.54 0.13 0.39 0.13 0.22 0.28 0.20 1.00 
Pakistan 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.04 
Peru 0.45 0.45 0.18 0.43 0.14 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.43 
Philippines 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.32 0.20 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.13 
Qatar 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.04 
Russia 0.34 0.34 0.11 0.56 0.13 0.35 0.35 0.27 0.37 
South Africa 0.44 0.44 0.16 0.58 0.15 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.44 
Thailand 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.36 0.19 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.26 











Table B.4: Correlation Matrix of Local Stock Market Returns (Continued) 
 
 Pakistan Peru Philippines Qatar Russia South Africa Thailand Turkey 
Brazil         
Chile         
China         
Czech Republic         
Egypt         
Indonesia         
Korea         
Malaysia         
Mexico         
Pakistan 1.0        
Peru 0.08 1.0       
Philippines 0.12 0.22 1.0      
Qatar 0.06 0.12 0.16 1.0     
Russia 0.01 0.39 0.20 0.14 1.0    
South Africa 0.07 0.44 0.27 0.13 0.56 1.0   
Thailand 0.12 0.28 0.31 0.17 0.29 0.32 1.0  
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